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Foreword  
 
The purpose of this document is to provide infection control guidance to help prevent the transmission 
of acute infectious respiratory diseases during health care, with emphasis on acute respiratory diseases 
that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern as defined in the International 
Health Regulations (2005; Annex 1). Managers of health-care facilities may also consider using this 
guidance to assist them in preparation for epidemics and pandemics. 
This document is intended to be used by government planners, health-care facility administrators, 
infection control professionals, occupational health specialists, other professionals involved in patient 
care and direct care providers.  
The infection control advice provided in the guidelines is based on available information on the main 
routes of transmission of pathogens, and is intended to provide guidance for continuous and 
sustainable improvement in safety of health care. These guidelines are designed to offer Member 
States a conceptual framework for individual adaptation according to local regulations, settings, needs 
and resources. Health-care facilities are encouraged to review the recommendations and to adapt them 
accordingly. 
The guidelines were developed after performing a systematic review of the scientific literature (in 
English) identified through PubMed (US National Library of Medicine) and the Cochrane Library, 
and secondary papers (in English, and also in Chinese, French, Portuguese and Spanish) identified 
from existing relevant guidelines. International and national infection control guidelines and infection 
control textbooks were also consulted. The document has undergone internal and external peer 
reviews. The Guideline Steering Group1 evaluated the comments suggested by the reviewers 
providing  guidance when opinions differed, and oversaw the incorporation of amendments and 
finalization of the document.  
Pilot tests of the guidelines will be conducted in 2007 and 2008 in each of the six WHO Regions to 
help provide local data on clarity of the document and generate information on resources required to 
carry out the recommendations, feasibility, and validity of the interventions concerned. The pilot tests 
may also help provide information for implementation and dissemination strategies. The guidelines 
will be reviewed and updated after the conclusion of the pilot tests. 
As in many other areas, the knowledge on modes of transmission of respiratory diseases is evolving 
rapidly. In addition, case surveillance and case and contact investigation are critical in defining and 
identifying changes in the epidemiology of human infections and will continue to inform infection 
control recommendations. Modifications to these guidelines will be made, as necessary, as additional 





                                                 
1 Guideline Steering Group: Denise Mary Cardo, CDC, Atlanta, USA; Cathryn Murphy, Infection Plus, Australia; Fernando Otaiza, 
Ministry of Health, Chile; Shirley Paton, Public Health Agency, Canada; Carmem L Pessoa-Silva, WHO/EPR; Cathy Roth, WHO/EPR 
Wing-Hong Seto, Queen Mary Hospital, China, Hong Kong SAR. All external experts have signed the declaration of interests in 
accordance with WHO policy and are available on request. 
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I.  List of acronyms and definition of terms used in the 
document 
  Acronyms 
ACH                air changes per hour 
AORN        Professional Organization of Perioperative Registered Nurses (USA) 
ARD                acute respiratory disease 
ASTM              American Society for Testing and Materials (former name) 
BFE                  bacterial filtration efficiency 
BiPAP              bilevel positive airway pressure 
BSL                  biosafety level 
CDC(US)         Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, United States of America 
CE                    Conformité Européenne (European Conformity) 
Co-V                coronavirus 
CPAP               continuous positive airway pressure 
EU                    European Union 
FDA                 Food and Drug Administration (United States of America) 
FFP                  filtering face piece 
HCF                 health-care facility 
HCW                health-care worker 
HVAC              heating, ventilation, and air conditioning 
IHR                  International Health Regulations 
ILI                    influenza-like illness 
NIOSH(US)     National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
OR                   operating room 
PFE                  particulate filtration efficiency 
PPE                  personal protective equipment 
ppm                  parts per million 
RSV                 respiratory syncytial virus 
RT-PCR           reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction 
SARS               severe acute respiratory disease 
SIGN(WHO)   Safe Injection Global Network 
WHO                World Health Organization 
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 Definitions of terms 
 
The following terms have been defined for the purpose of this document. 
 
Acute respiratory diseases  
Acute respiratory diseases (ARDs) are upper or lower respiratory tract illnesses, usually infectious in 
etiology, which can result in a spectrum of illnesses ranging from asymptomatic or mild infection to 
severe and fatal disease, depending on the causative pathogen, environmental, and host factors. 
However, for the purposes of this document, an ARD is defined as an acute respiratory tract illness 
that is caused by an infectious agent transmitted from person to person. The onset of symptoms is 
typically rapid, over a period of hours to several days. Symptoms include fever, cough, and often sore 
throat, coryza, shortness of breath, wheezing, or difficulty breathing. Examples of pathogens causing 
ARDs included in these guidelines are rhinovirus, respiratory syncytial virus, parainfluenza virus, 
severe acute respiratory syndrome-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) and influenza virus. 
 
Acute respiratory diseases of potential concern  
Acute respiratory diseases of potential concern (ARDs of potential concern) refer to 1- SARS-CoV 
(see section III.1) 2- new influenza virus causing human infection (see section III.2); and 3- novel 
ARDs that can cause large-scale outbreaks and outbreaks with high morbidity and mortality (see 
section III.3). 
 
Adequately ventilated single room 
A single room, or a side room in the ward, with ≥ 12 air changes per hour (ACH) without controlled 
direction of air flow. 
 
Aerosol-generating procedures associated with pathogen transmission 
Procedures that have been reported to be aerosol-generating and associated with a documented 
increased risk of pathogen transmission. These include intubation and related procedures, 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, bronchoscopy, autopsy and surgery where high-speed devices (e.g. 
saw) are used (see Annex A for details).  
 
Airborne precaution room 
An airborne precaution room is a room with ≥ 12 air changes per hour (ACH) and controlled direction 
of air flow, and can be used to contain airborne infections (1-3) and ARDs caused by a novel agent 
with the potential to have a high public health impact. An airborne precaution room can be naturally 
or mechanically ventilated. In addition to the requirement of ≥ 12 ACH, in a mechanically ventilated 
airborne precaution room, negative pressure is created to control the direction of air flow. It is 
equivalent to the “airborne infection isolation room” described by the United States Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)(4). In naturally ventilated airborne precaution rooms the air 
flow should be directed to areas free of transit, or permit the rapid dilution of contaminated air into the 




Airborne transmission of infectious agents refers to the transmission of disease caused by 
dissemination of droplet nuclei that remain infectious when suspended in air over long distance and 
time. Airborne transmission can be further categorized into obligate or preferential airborne 
transmission(5).  
Obligate airborne transmission refers to pathogens that are transmitted only by deposition of droplet 
nuclei under natural conditions (e.g. pulmonary tuberculosis). 
Preferential airborne transmission refers to pathogens that can initiate infection by multiple routes, 
but are predominantly transmitted by droplet nuclei (e.g. measles, chickenpox). 
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Air changes per hour (ACH) 
Volume of air moved in one hour. One air change per hour in a room, home, or building means that 
all the air in that environment will be replaced in one hour (6).  
 
Alcohol-based hand rub 
An alcohol-containing preparation designed for application to the hands for hand antisepsis. 
 
Anteroom 
A small room leading from a corridor into another room, often an isolation room. 
 
Caregiver 
A person who provides support and assistance, formal or informal, with various activities to people 
with disabilities or long-term conditions, or elderly people. This person may provide emotional or 
financial support, as well as hands-on help with different tasks (7).  
 
Cleaning 
The removal of dirt from a device or surface, using either the physical action of scrubbing with a 




Also known as infectious waste, it refers to hazardous waste capable of causing infections in humans. 
This includes: contaminated animal waste; human blood and blood products; waste from isolation 
areas; pathological waste (e.g. human tissues); and discarded sharps (needles, scalpels or broken 
medical instruments). The definition may vary depending on local legislations and regulations. 
 
Cohorting and special measures 
Cohorting refers to placing patients infected or colonized with the same known pathogen in the same 
designated unit (same space and staff in the unit) to which patients without the pathogen are not 
admitted.  
Special measures refer to the placing of patients with the same suspected diagnosis (similar 




Contact transmission can be direct and indirect. Direct contact transmission involves both a direct 
body surface to body surface contact and physical transfer of microorganisms between an infected or 
colonized person and a susceptible host. Indirect contact transmission involves contact of a 
susceptible host with a contaminated intermediate object (e.g. contaminated hands), that carry and 
transfer the microorganisms (3).  
 
Disinfection 
A process that eliminates all pathogenic microorganisms, with the exception of bacterial spores, from 
inanimate objects, for the purpose of minimizing risk of infection.  
 
Droplet transmission 
Droplets are generated from an infected (source) person primarily during coughing, sneezing, and 
talking. Transmission occurs when these droplets containing microorganisms are propelled a short 
distance (usually < 1m) through the air and deposited on the conjunctivae, mouth, nasal, throat or 
pharynx mucosa of another person. Because droplets do not remain suspended in the air, special air 
handling and ventilation are not required to prevent droplet transmission (3).  
 
Environmental mechanical ventilation 
Use of mechanical fans to introduce and distribute outdoor and/or properly treated recycled air into a 
building or a room. 
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Environmental natural ventilation 
Natural ventilation uses natural forces to introduce and distribute outdoor air into a building. These 
natural forces can be wind pressure or pressure generated by the density difference between indoor 
and outdoor air.  
 
Hand hygiene 
A general term that applies to hand washing, antiseptic hand washing, antiseptic hand rubbing, or 
surgical hand antisepsis.  
 
Health-care facility 
Any establishment that is engaged in direct patient care on site(7).  
 
Health-care setting 
Clinical context where health care is provided (e.g. hospital, outpatient clinic, home). 
 
Health-care worker 
A variety of professionals (medical practitioners, nurses, physical and occupational therapists, social 
workers, pharmacists, spiritual counsellors, etc) who are involved in providing coordinated and 
comprehensive care (7).  
 
Health personnel  
All persons employed or contracted to provide health services (7).  
 
Human influenza  
An acute contagious viral infection, commonly occurring in seasonal epidemics (seasonal influenza) 
or rarely pandemics (pandemic influenza), characterized by inflammation of the respiratory tract, and 
typically manifested by the sudden onset of fever, chills, muscular pain, severe prostration, sore throat, 
and cough (8). Transmission of infection occurs at close range, mainly through droplets and 
occasionally through contact. To date, there is a lack of evidence to suggest that the infection is 
airborne-transmitted among humans in health-care settings(9). 
 
Infectious respiratory aerosols 
Respiratory aerosols which contain infectious particles. Aerosol size is determined by the force and 
pressure involved in the generation of the particles. The final size depends on the nature of the fluid 
containing the organism(s), the force and pressure at emission, the initial size of the aerosol, 
environmental conditions (e.g. temperature, relative humidity, and air flow), the time spent airborne, 
and the size of the organism(s) within a droplet. The distance and length of time particles remain 
suspended in the air is determined by the types of organisms, particle size, settling velocity, relative 
humidity and air flow. Large particles typically remain suspended in the air for limited period of time 
and settle within 1 m (3 feet) of the source. Smaller particles evaporate quickly, and the resulting 
dried residues settle from the air slowly, and may remain suspended in the air for variable lengths of 
time. The definitions and classification of the different types of infectious respiratory aerosols are 
evolving, and the implications for the infection control measures are not yet clear. However, for the 
purpose of this document, infectious respiratory aerosols will be classified into: 
Droplets: Respiratory aerosols > 5 µm in diameter. 
Droplet nuclei: Respiratory aerosols ≤ 5 µm in diameter. 
 
Medical mask 
A surgical or procedure mask protecting caregivers against droplet-transmitted pathogens and/or as 
part of facial protection for patient-care activities which are likely to generate splashes or sprays of 
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Mixed-mode environmental ventilation  
Well designed combined use of both mechanical and natural ventilation. 
 
Negative pressure room 
A room in which the air pressure differential between the room and the adjacent indoor airspace 
directs the air flowing into the room (i.e. room air is prevented from leaking out of the room and into 
adjacent areas such as the corridor).  
 
New influenza virus 
A new strain of influenza virus that has not previously been circulating among human hosts. For 
example, avian influenza is an infection of birds caused by avian influenza viruses from one of the 16 
type A subtypes. All birds are thought to be susceptible to infection with avian influenza viruses; 
certain avian influenza viruses (H5 and H7) may cause lethal outbreaks in poultry. Humans can 
occasionally be infected with avian influenza A viruses (10).  
 
Pandemic 
An epidemic occurring worldwide or over a very wide area, crossing boundaries of several countries, 
and usually affecting a large number of people (11).  
 
Particulate respirator 
Also known as a filtering face piece respirator, a particulate respirator is a type of mask that uses a 
filter as an integral part of the face piece or with the entire face piece composed of the filtering 
medium and a means of sealing to the face.   
 
Quantum 
A quantity or an amount of particles. 
 
Source control 
A means of reducing the emission of droplets when a patient with ARD coughs or sneezes, such as 
covering of mouth and nose with hands or other materials (e.g. tissues, handkerchiefs, cloth masks, or 
medical masks), in order to reduce the dispersion of droplets from the infected/colonized patient. 
Hand hygiene should be performed immediately after contact with respiratory secretions. 
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II. Executive summary 
In an era of emerging and re-emerging communicable disease health threats, the importance of 
infection prevention and control measures in health-care settings should not be underestimated. 
Transmission of communicable disease/pathogen is an ever-evolving subject, and transmission of 
pathogens that cause acute respiratory diseases (ARD) is no exception. The main mode of 
transmission of most ARDs are through droplets, but transmission through contact (including hand 
contamination followed by self-inoculation) and infectious respiratory aerosols of various sizes and at 
short range may also occur for some pathogens. Because many symptoms of ARDs are non-specific 
and rapid diagnostic tests are not always available, the etiology is often not immediately known. In 
addition, pharmaceutical interventions (vaccine, antivirals, antimicrobials) for ARDs may not be 
available.   
 
These guidelines provide recommendations for the non-pharmacological aspects of infection 
prevention and control for ARDs in health care. Other WHO documents address the use of vaccines 
and antivirals for influenza:  
 
WHO guidelines for the use of seasonal influenza vaccine in humans1 
WHO rapid advice guidelines on pharmacological management of humans infected with avian 
influenza A (H5N1) virus2 
 
The importance of administrative and environmental controls for decreasing transmission of acute 
respiratory infections was well-illustrated by SARS. Administrative and infection controls, including 
early detection, isolation and reporting, and establishment of infection control infrastructure, are key 
components for containment and mitigation of the impact of pathogens that may constitute a major 
public health threat. Environmental controls, such as adequate ventilation and proper patient 
placement, were highlighted during the SARS experience as crucial measures to help to reduce the 
spread of respiratory pathogens associated with health care. In these guidelines, the options of using 
natural ventilation and/or exhaust fan assisted ventilation in health-care facilities (HCF) are 
considered (Part V).  
 
The present document is intended to help policy-makers, administrators and health-care workers 
(HCWs) in charge of infection control programmes to prioritize infection control measures in health 
care, especially in settings with limited resources. 
 
This document is composed of six parts: Part I defines the terms used in the guidelines; Part II 
provides a summary of the main recommendations and rationale; Part III provides an introduction to 
the concepts that will be discussed in the guidelines; Part IV provides a detailed description of the 
infection control recommendations; Part V describes the principles of environmental ventilation for 
airborne infections; and Part VI outlines the main components of HCF preparedness plans to prevent 
and control the ARD outbreaks that may constitute an international public health concern. The 
annexes provide background information for the recommendations in Part IV. 
                               
 
                                                 
1 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/seasonal_vaccine/en/ 
2 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/pharmamanagement/en/index.html 
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      Summary of infection control recommendations 
 
 Standard Precautions are basic infection control precautions in health care (see Annex C.1) 
and should be applied routinely in all health-care settings when providing care for all 
patients. If these basic precautions are not in place, additional specific precautions will 
not be effective. The main elements of Standard Precautions include hand hygiene, use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE) to avoid direct contact with patient's blood, body 
fluids, secretions and non-intact skin, prevention of needle stick/sharp injury and cleaning 
and disinfection of the environment and equipment.  
 When caring for patients with infectious acute respiratory diseases, Standard and Droplet 
Precautions (Annex C.2) should be practised whenever possible. If there are insufficient 
single patient rooms and cohorting of patients with the same known etiological diagnosis 
is not possible, maintain spatial separation of at least 1 m between the infected patient and 
other patients.  
 In paediatric patients with ARDs, when clinical symptoms and signs suggest a likely 
diagnosis during the peak season of certain viruses, (e.g. croup and parainfluenza, acute 
bronchiolitis and respiratory syncytial virus), Contact, Standard and Droplet Precautions 
(Annex C) should be implemented whenever possible.  
 Additional protective measures may be necessary when providing care for patients 
infected with some specific pathogens (see Table 1). If the patient has indications 
suggestive of an ARD caused by a novel pathogen with epidemic/pandemic potential 
(refer to section III.3.3 for the indications) and the route of transmission has not been 
established, Airborne and Contact Precautions should be added to Standard Precautions 
(see Annex C for details of Isolation Precautions). 
 
Other important points 
Promotion of an institutional safety climate helps to improve conformity with recommended measures 
and thus subsequent risk reduction. Several strategies should be combined and HCF leadership is key 
to provide support and to promote compliance with infection control recommendations.  
 
 The key strategies for reducing the risk of pathogen exposure and transmission associated 
with health care include administrative controls, engineering and environmental controls, 
and use of PPE (see section III.4).  
 Administrative (e.g. provision of adequate staff and supplies, education of health workers, 
patients and visitors), engineering and environmental controls are fundamental 
components in the construction of an infection control structure to enable the safest 
possible health care. Adequate environmental ventilation is a key engineering control for 
respiratory infections and should be carefully considered (see Section V). 
 The use of PPE should be defined by policies and procedures specifically addressing 
infection control issues (e.g. isolation precautions). Its effectiveness is dependent on 
adequate and regular supplies, adequate staff training, proper hand hygiene, and in 
particular, appropriate human behaviour. 
 Source control measures should be implemented for all persons with respiratory 
symptoms through the promotion of respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette (Annex C.1.3). 
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III. Introduction and scope of the guidelines 
   III.1 ARDs in health care 
 
ARDs are the leading causes of infectious disease morbidity and mortality in the world. Almost four 
million people die from ARDs each year, with 98% due to lower respiratory tract infection. The 
mortality rates are particularly high among infants, children and the elderly, predominantly in low- 
and middle-income countries (12). Likewise, ARDs are among the most frequent causes of 
consultation or admission to HCFs, particularly in paediatric services (13).  
 
Bacteria are a major cause of lower respiratory tract infection, with Streptococcus pneumoniae being 
the most common cause of bacterial community-acquired pneumonia in many countries. However, the 
pathogens that most often cause ARDs are viruses, or mixed viral–bacterial infections. Meanwhile, 
the threat of ARDs due to novel organisms that have epidemic or pandemic potential warrants special 
precautions and preparedness (14).  
 
The incidence of specific ARDs varies according to several factors. The distribution and outcomes of 
the diseases are related to (15-17):  
 environmental conditions (e.g. air pollutants, household crowding, humidity, hygiene, 
season, temperature); 
 availability and effectiveness of medical care and infection prevention measures to 
contain spread (e.g. vaccines, access to HCFs, isolation capacity); 
 host factors, such as age, cigarette smoking, host ability to transmit infection, immune 
status, nutritional status, prior or concurrent infection with other pathogens, underlying 
medical conditions; and 
 pathogenic characteristics, including modes of transmission, transmissibility, virulence 
factors (e.g. genes encoding toxins), and microbial load (inoculum size). 
 
   III.2  Scope of the current guidelines 
 
Acute respiratory diseases may present with a wide range of clinical symptoms. For the purpose of 
this document, acute infectious respiratory diseases in general, and ARDs of epidemic or pandemic 
potential will be highlighted. Such ARDs have the potential for rapid spread and may have serious 
public health impact. According to the International Health Regulations , IHR (2005)1, respiratory 
disease events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern include: 
 severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)  
 human influenza caused by a new subtype, including human episodes of avian influenza 
 pneumonic plague 
 novel ARD agents that can cause large-scale outbreaks or outbreaks with high morbidity 
and mortality. 
Infection control recommendations for prevention and control of pneumonic plague have been 
addressed in a previous WHO publication, Plague Manual. Epidemiology, Distribution, Surveillance 
and Control, 1999,2 and are not described in these guidelines. 
                                                 
1 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/ihr/en/ 
2 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/plague/WHO_CDS_CSR_EDC_99_2_EN/en/index.html 
Infection prevention and control of epidemic- and pandemic-prone acute respiratory diseases in health care 
WHO Interim Guidelines 
 
– 13 –  
 
These guidelines focus on infection prevention and control precautions for ARDs that:  
 cause acute respiratory tract infection, including pneumonia or acute respiratory distress 
syndrome; 
 cause severe disease in susceptible people with apparently normal immune systems;  
 may constitute a public health emergency of international concern as defined by IHR 
(2005) (above), except plague. 
 
Tuberculosis seldom presents as an ARD, but its spread has been associated with health care and is a 
major concern. Infection control recommendations for prevention and control of tuberculosis in HCFs 
have been addressed in previous WHO publications, Guidelines for the Prevention of Tuberculosis in 
Health Care Facilities in Resource-Limited Settings, 1999,1 and will not be described in these 
guidelines. The current document focuses on the most common ARDs and highlight ARDs of 
potential concern. 
 
  III.3  ARDs that may constitute a public health emergency of  
international concern covered in the current document 
III.3.1  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is caused by a SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) 
(18), which can infect animals and humans. SARS was first reported in Asia in February 2003 and 
spread to people in over 24 countries in Asia, North America, South America, and Europe before the 
outbreak was contained (19). SARS is currently not known to be circulating among humans; however, 
it could still be circulating in animal hosts and it may re-emerge in humans (20). Human-to-human 
transmission of SARS occurs mainly through droplets or contact, although transmission through 
infectious respiratory aerosols of various sizes may occur at short range (21).  
III.3.2  New influenza virus causing human infection 
When a new influenza virus first emerges in another species, it is not yet adapted to humans, and may 
circulate in animal hosts and generate sporadic human infections. It may subsequently evolve to have 
human-to-human transmission. During this period, early detection, isolation, and warning are crucial. 
Several episodes of sporadic avian influenza infection in humans have been described previously. 
Avian influenza A viruses typically infect birds, but sometimes can infect other animals and humans, 
and have been associated with clusters of human cases (22-25). The strain associated with the largest 
number of human episodes is H5N1. Human episodes of avian influenza A (H5N1) were first reported 
in  China, Hong Kong, Special Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) in 1997, and re-emerged 
and were found in other countries from 2003 onwards. Most instances of avian influenza infection in 
humans have resulted from contact with infected poultry (e.g. domesticated chickens, ducks, or 
turkeys) or surfaces contaminated with secretions/excretions from infected birds (22-28). To date, no 
efficient or sustained human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A (H5N1) has been 
demonstrated. Among the possible human-to-human episodes, transmission was associated with close 
and extensive unprotected contact, suggesting spread mainly through respiratory droplets and/or 
contact (29).  
III.3.3  Novel ARD with potential to have a high public health impact 
Infectious diseases have spread across populations and regions throughout history and it is likely that 
newly-emerging infectious diseases will continue to be identified. Many infectious diseases have 
animal reservoirs and can infect humans under certain circumstances. The following factors have  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1 Available at: http://www.emro.who.int/stb/media/pdf/WHO99-269.pdf 
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been associated with the emergence and spread of infectious diseases (14, 30): 
 the changes in human demographics and behaviour  
 the impact of new technologies and industries  
 economic development and changes in land use  
 increased international travel and commerce  
 microbial adaptation and change  
 the breakdown of public health measures, and 
 sharing an environment with domestic or wild animals or birds. 
 
These factors can facilitate the transmission of infectious agents from animal to human and from 
human to human. When a new infectious disease is recognized, the modes of transmission are not 
well understood. The epidemiological and microbiological studies to help determine the modes of 
transmission and identify possible prevention and control measures may be protracted. Due to the lack 
of information on modes of spread, Airborne and Contact Precautions should be added to the routine 
standard precautions whenever possible to reduce the risk of transmission of a newly-emerging agent. 
These precautions should be implemented until further studies reveal the mode(s) of transmission. 
Indications suggesting that additional precautions are needed include epidemiological and clinical 
clues, as detailed in section IV.1. These indications may change when additional information is 
available. 
It is very important to maintain close surveillance of HCWs from the very beginning and during an 
outbreak with a novel pathogen, since it may be an important source of information about means of 
transmission, both for community and healthcare-associated transmission. 
 
 
  III.4 Infection control guiding principles 
 
The conditions and levels of complexity in HCFs vary within, and between countries. Policy-makers 
and health administrators should identify strategies with favourable cost–effectiveness ratios based on 
the HCF characteristics and the potential for sustainable and progressive improvement. 
 
The foundations of infection control for ARD patient care include early and rapid recognition of 
patients, application of routine infection control precautions for all patients (standard precautions, see 
Annex C.1), additional precautions in selected patients (e.g. based on the presumptive diagnosis), and 
establishing an infection control infrastructure for the HCF to support infection control activities  
 
Infection control strategies in HCFs are commonly based on the following types of control: 
 
Reduction/elimination 
Infected patients represent the main source of pathogens in health-care settings and 
reducing/eliminating the dissemination of infectious agent from the source is critical. Examples of 
reduction and elimination include promotion of respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette (Annex C.1.3) 
and treatment to render a patient non-infectious. 
 
Administrative controls 
It is important for HCF management to warrant the needed resources for the implementation of 
infection control measures. These include establishment of sustainable infection control 
infrastructures and activities, clear policies on early recognition of ARDs of potential concern, 
implementation of appropriate infection control measures (e.g. Standard Precautions for all patients), 
regular supplies and organization of services (e.g. creation of patient triage system and placement). 
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The HCF management should also have staff planning to promote an adequate patient-to-staff ratio, 
provide staff training, and establish staff health programmes (e.g. vaccination, prophylaxis) to 
enhance the general health of the HCWs. 
 
Environmental and engineering controls 
These include methods to reduce the concentration of infectious respiratory aerosols (e.g. droplet 
nuclei) in the air and to reduce the presence of contaminated surfaces and items according to the 
epidemiology of the infection. Examples of primary engineering controls for infectious respiratory 
aerosols include adequate environmental ventilation (≥ 12 ACH) and spatial separation (> 1m) 
between patients. For infectious agents that spread by contact, cleaning and disinfection of 
contaminated surfaces and items are important environmental control methods. 
 
Personal protective equipment (PPE) 
The above strategies reduce, but do not eliminate the possibility of exposure to biological risks. 
Therefore, to further reduce these risks to HCWs and other persons interacting with the patients in the 
HCF, PPE should be used together with the above strategies in specific situations that pose an 
increased risk of pathogen transmission. The use of PPE should be defined by policies and procedures 
specifically addressing infection control (e.g. isolation precautions). The effectiveness of PPE is 
dependent on adequate and regular supplies, adequate staff training, proper hand hygiene, and in 
particular, appropriate human behaviour. 
 
The above mentioned types of control are deeply interrelated. They should be harmonized to promote 
a safety institutional climate, the foundation for safe behaviours.  
 
   III.5 Environmental ventilation 
 
Environmental ventilation refers to the process of introducing and distributing outdoor air, and/or 
properly treated recirculated air into a building or a room. Ventilation and air conditioning are two 
different concepts. The purpose of air conditioning is to maintain a thermally-comfortable indoor 
environment. The purpose of ventilation is to maintain good indoor air quality, i.e. ensuring that 
indoor air is safe for breathing purposes. Isolation rooms with adequate ventilation controls and 
controlled uni-directional flow of air should be available whenever possible in HCFs. This is 
especially important to reduce the transmission of pathogens that are transmitted through the obligate 
or preferential airborne route (e.g. pulmonary tuberculosis, measles, chickenpox). Most respiratory 
diseases (e.g. parainfluenza virus, RSV, influenza virus) do not spread readily by the airborne route 
over longer distances in health care settings, and patients can be adequately contained without 
environmental ventilatory controls. However, as transmission by the airborne route may occur for 
some ARDs, for patients infected by a novel agent causing an ARD of potential concern, Airborne 
Precautions should be practised until the route of transmission is clarified. Thus, if airborne 
precaution rooms are available, these patients should also be placed in them. If airborne precaution 
rooms are not available, the accommodation of these patients in adequately ventilated single rooms, 
which have ≥ 12 ACH but not necessarily controlled directional flow of air, should be considered.  
 
Some infection control texts suggest that a mechanically ventilated negative pressure room is needed 
for proper isolation of patients with an airborne infection (1-3). However, there may be other possible 
options that are effective in removing airborne contaminants and potentially more affordable (e.g. 
natural ventilation). Details about environmental ventilation for respiratory infections are discussed in 
section V. 
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IV.  Infection prevention and control recommendations 
  IV.1  Early recognition, isolation, reporting, and surveillance of 
episodes of ARD of potential international public health 
concern 
 
Early recognition, isolation, reporting, and surveillance of episodes of ARD of potential concern are 
administrative control measures. Recommendations related to these issues are placed first and as a 
separate section because they are most critical for the prevention of spread of ARDs of potential 
concern, both in the heath-care settings and within the international community. HCFs should: 
 
Ö   Prioritize the establishment of methods ensuring early recognition and investigation of 
persons possibly suffering from ARDs of potential concern (see Figure 1)(31, 32).  
Ö    Reinforce infection control precautions promptly when an ARD of potential concern is 
suspected (see Table 1)(33).  
Ö    Link the hospital-based infection surveillance systems to the public health infection 
surveillance system and immediately report all available essential information regarding 
possible episodes of ARDs of potential concern to public health authorities via the local 
surveillance system (34). This is in line with the requirements of the IHR (2005) in force 
since June 2007. The IHR (2005) require the international notification to WHO by States 
Parties of events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern. 
Ö   The public health authorities should also establish channels to inform HCFs and the 
community about ongoing epidemic ARDs, in order to keep the HCFs aware of the extent 
and types of problems to be encountered and be prepared. 
Ö   All patients suspected or confirmed to have an ARD of potential concern should be placed 
in a room or area separate from other patients and evaluated as soon as possible (35, 36). 
 
Although the case definition may vary according to the specific disease, there are some general 
epidemiological and clinical clues to prompt suspicion. 
 
 Epidemiological clues: Indications suggesting that isolation precautions are needed 
include a patient's history of travel to countries where there are patients known to be 
suffering from an ARD of potential concern within the known or suspected incubation 
period, possible occupational exposure to pathogens or novel agents causing ARDs of 
potential concern, and unprotected contact with patients with ARDs of potential concern 
within the known or suspected incubation period, or being part of a rapidly spreading 
cluster of patients with ARD of unknown cause (35, 37-41). The last would include 
exposure to household members with ARDs. For novel agents, the epidemiological clues 
may change when additional information is available. 
 Clinical clues: In all patients who present with, or who have died of, unexplained severe 
acute febrile respiratory illness (e.g. fever > 38°C, cough, shortness of breath), or other 
severe unexplained illness (e.g. encephalopathy or diarrhoea)(35, 41-46), with an 
exposure history consistent with the ARD of potential concern mentioned above within 
the known or suspected incubation period. 
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Ö   Family members who live with ARD patients and accompany ARD patients to the HCF 
can be assumed to have been potentially exposed to the same ARD and should also be 
evaluated for infection (35, 41-48).  
 
Rationale 
Patients with severe acute respiratory diseases tend to seek care at HCFs, so HCFs play a critical role 
in identifying early signals of newly emerging ARDs that may constitute a public health emergency of 
concern locally or internationally. Early identification and reporting offers an opportunity for 
successful containment. Prompt identification and management of patients, HCWs, or visitors who 
may be infected with an ARD of potential concern with pandemic and epidemic potential are key 
administrative control measures and are critical to minimize the risk of healthcare-associated 
transmission and to enable an efficient public health response. The response includes patient isolation, 
implementation of adequate infection control measures, treatment, and immediate reporting. The 
recognition of possible episodes depends on the ARD case definition, which may evolve as additional 
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Figure 1.  Decision tree for infection control measures for patients known or 





















































aFor the purpose of this document, ARDs of potential concern include: SARS, new influenza virus causing human infection 
(e.g., human cases of avian influenza), and novel organism causing ARDs that can cause outbreaks with high morbidity and 
mortality. Clinical and epidemiologic clues (Section IV.1): e.g., severe disease in a previously healthy host, exposure to 
household member or close contact with severe ARD, cluster of cases, travel, exposure to ill animals or laboratory. 
 bAirborne precaution rooms include both mechanically and naturally ventilated rooms with ≥ 12 ACH and controlled   
direction of airflow (Section V). 
 cThe term “special measures” means allowing patients with epidemiological and clinical information suggestive of  a similar 
diagnosis to share a room, but with a spatial separation of ≥ 1 m. 
 
Report to public health 
authorities
Patient
Patient enters triage with 
symptoms of acute febrile 
respiratory illness 
Patient diagnosed as having 
ARD of potential concerna
Infection control precautions (Table1) 
to remain in place during the period of 
infectivity (section IV.2.4.1)
Infection control measures
Ö HCWs should perform adequate hand hygiene, use           
medical mask and, if splashes onto eyes are 
anticipated, eye protection (goggles/face shield) (see 
Table 1). 
Ö Paediatric patients with clinical symptoms and signs 
indicating specific diagnosis (e.g. croup for 
parainfluenza, acute bronchiolitis for RSV), especially 
during seasonal outbreaks, may require isolation 
precautions as soon as possible.
Ö Apply source control (e.g. use of tissues, handkerchiefs 
or medical masks) on the patient in the waiting room 
when coughing or sneezing, and hand hygiene after 
contact with respiratory secretions.
Ö If possible, accommodate patient at least 1m away 
from other patients.
Ö HCWs should use PPE (medical mask or particulate 
respirator, eye protection, gown, and gloves) and 
perform adequate hand hygiene (see Table 1). 
Ö Airborne precaution roomb or single well-ventilated 
room accommodation, if available.
Ö If single room is not possible, cohort patients with 
same etiological diagnosis.
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a. Bacterial ARD refers to common bacterial respiratory infections caused by organisms such as Streptococcus 
pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, Chlamydia spp., and Mycoplasma pneumoniae. 
b. When a novel ARD is newly identified, the mode of transmission is usually unknown. Implement the highest available 
level of infection control precautions, until the situation and mode of transmission is clarified. 
c. Perform hand hygiene in accordance with Standard Precautions (see Annex C). 
d. Gloves and gowns should be worn in accordance with Standard Precautions (see Annex C). If glove demand is likely to 
exceed supply, glove use should always be prioritized for contact with blood and body fluids (nonsterile gloves), and 
contact with sterile sites (sterile gloves). 
e. If splashing with blood or other body fluids is anticipated and gowns are not fluid-resistant, a waterproof apron should 
be worn over the gown. 
f. Facial protection (medical masks and eye protection) should be used in accordance with Standard Precautions by 
HCWs if activities are likely to generate splashes or sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions and excretions on to 
mucosa of eyes, nose or mouth; or if in close contact with a patient with respiratory symptoms (e.g. coughing/sneezing) 
and sprays of secretions may reach the mucosa of eyes, nose or mouth. 
g. As of the date of this document, no sustained efficient human-to-human transmission of avian influenza A is known to 
have occurred, and the available evidence does not suggest airborne transmission from humans to humans. Therefore a 
medical mask is adequate for routine care. 
h. The current evidence suggests that SARS transmission in health-care settings occurs mainly by droplet and contact 
routes. Therefore a medical mask is adequate for routine care. 
i. See Table 6. 
j. Some aerosol-generating procedures have been associated with increased risk of transmission of SARS and tuberculosis 
(Table 6). To date, the infectious risk associated with aerosol-generating procedures in patients with bacterial ARDs, 
ARDs caused by rhinovirus, parainfluenza, RSV and adenovirus is not defined. As a minimum, a tightly-fitted medical 
mask should be used. 
k. If medical masks are not available, use other methods for source control (e.g. handkerchiefs, tissues or hands) when 
coughing and sneezing. 
l. These are common pathogens in children, who may not be able to comply with this recommendation.  
m. Cohort patients with the same diagnosis. If this is not possible, place patient beds at least 1 m apart. 
n. Airborne precaution rooms can be naturally or mechanically ventilated, with adequate air change rate of at least 12 
ACH and controlled direction of air flow. 
o. Airborne precaution rooms, if available, should be prioritized for patients with airborne infections (e.g. pulmonary 
tuberculosis, chickenpox, measles) and for those with novel organisms causing ARD. 
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IV.2  Administrative control strategies for HCFs 
 
Ö   Strengthen or establish an infection control committee and infection control programmes 
with trained personnel to keep infection control policies current and to monitor 
compliance with them (35, 41-50).  
 
Provide adequate support for promotion of better infection control practices through the following 
recommendations: 
 
Ö    Use evidence-based methods to increase compliance with infection control precautions, 
including multimodal strategies (e.g. change in infrastructure, education, posters, 
reminders, senior management engagement, performance feedback) (51-53).  
Ö    Educate HCWs to follow infection control precautions with all patients with acute febrile 
respiratory illness (54-56).  
Ö    Ensure that adequate infection control supplies are provided (54, 56-58), such as: 
− hand hygiene facilities such as soap and clean running water, alcohol-based 
hand rub, paper or single use towels; 
− PPE for patient care (e.g. masks/respirators, gowns, gloves, eye protection);  
− PPE for heavy duties (e.g. closed protective footwear, waterproof aprons, and 
rubber gloves); and  
− an adequate supply of appropriate cleaning and disinfection materials. 
 
Ö   Develop plans for the evaluation and management of patients known or suspected to 
beinfected with an ARD of potential concern including rapid screening (establishment of 
triage) and immediate implementation of infection control precautions (35, 43, 59).  
Ö    Develop systems to promptly identify and isolate patients with possible ARD of potential 
concern (35, 43, 54, 59) (see section V.1) and to promptly notify public health authorities 
(34).  
Ö    In countries with reported ARDs of potential concern, reinforce the reporting system in 
HCFs (e.g. post signage at all entrances and clinical evaluation areas such as emergency 
departments) to alert patients and visitors to report severe acute febrile respiratory illness 
immediately to health-care providers (60).    
Ö   Once a patient with a confirmed ARD of potential concern has been admitted to the 
facility, increase infection control surveillance to detect evidence of transmission to other 





Hospital administrators and governments play a key role in creating the necessary conditions at the 
institutional level to promote the prevention of spread of healthcare-associated pathogens. Written 
guidelines, availability of necessary resources (staff and supplies), promotion of a culture or tradition 
of adherence to infection control practices, and administrative leadership or support, are all targets for 
improvement. Enhancing individual and institutional attitudes regarding the feasibility of making 
changes, obtaining active participation, and promoting a safety climate, all represent major challenges.  
Lessons from the SARS outbreak show that important factors associated with compliance were the 
perception of HCWs that their facilities had clear policies and protocols, the perceived attitudes and 
actions of management regarding the importance of occupational health and safety, having adequate 
training in infection control procedures, and having fast access to specialists. Education, regular 
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supplies, adequate staffing, institutional climate, and leadership are the cornerstones for promotion of 
good infection control practices (57). It is essential that HCFs develop preparedness plans addressing 
the abovementioned elements (see section VI). 
 
IV.2.1 Isolation precautions  
 
Ö      When providing care for ARD patients, proper isolation precautions must be taken. 
Standard Precautions (Annex C.1) are ROUTINE infection control precautions that 
should apply to ALL patients, in ALL health-care settings (64). Annex C.1 summarizes 
the application and principles of Standard Precautions in health care. 
 
The types of additional precautions needed depend on:  
 the presence of epidemiological and clinical clues suggesting that patients have ARDs of 
potential concern,  
 the suspected or confirmed causative agents of the ARDs (37, 39-41, 43, 65), and 
 the type of contact with patient.  
 
Rationale 
Most acute respiratory infections are transmitted predominantly through droplets, but in some, other 
modes of transmission may play an important role. The type of infection control precautions should 
be tailored accordingly (Table 1). In addition, transmission of some of these infections has been 
associated with particular procedures, such as aerosol-generating procedures. These latter procedures 
have the potential to increase the risk of infection transmission (see Annex A, Table 6). Enhanced 
personal protection is warranted at least for those procedures with a documented increased risk of 
infection transmission (Annex A, Table 6).  
 
Details of different types of isolation precautions are described in Annex C.  
 
IV.2.2  Cohorting and special measures 
For all ARDs 
Ö    Cohorting refers to placing patients infected or colonized with the same pathogens in the 
same designated unit (same space and staff in the unit). Whenever possible, cohorting 
should be used for implementation of isolation precautions when single rooms are not 
available (64).  
Ö    If the etiological diagnosis is not laboratory-confirmed, cohorting, as described above, is 
not possible. Because of the transmission risk, patients should be housed in single rooms, 
whenever possible.  
Ö    However, if sufficient single rooms are not available, apply special measures. Only allow  
patients with epidemiological and clinical information suggestive of a similar diagnosis to 
share rooms, and with a spatial separation of at least 1 m from one another.  
Ö    Avoid sharing of equipment, but if unavoidable, ensure that reusable equipment is  
appropriately disinfected between patients (64).  
Ö    Ensure regular cleaning and proper disinfection of common areas (66), and adequate hand    
hygiene by patients, visitors and caregivers (67, 68).  
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For ARDs of potential concern 
Ö    If rooms used for isolation of ARDs of potential concern (single rooms or airborne 
precaution rooms) are insufficient for individual isolation, apply either cohorting or 
special measures (see above).  
Ö   Whenever possible, HCWs assigned to patient-care units for patients with ARDs of 
potential concern should be experienced and should not “float” or be assigned also to 
other patient-care areas. 
Ö   The number of persons entering the assigned unit/area for isolation, cohorting, or special 
measures should be limited to the minimum number necessary for patient care and support 
(55, 69). 
Ö   Consider having designated portable X-ray equipment available in assigned areas.  
 
IV.2.3 Transport of patients inside and outside HCFs 
IV.2.3.1 Patient transport within HCFs 
For all ARDs 
Ö   As per respiratory hygiene recommendations (see Annex C), medical masks are 
appropriate for use by ARD patients to contain respiratory droplets , and should be worn 
during transport or when care is necessary outside of the isolation room/area (64). If 
medical masks are not available, instruct the patients (or parents of paediatric patients) to 
use other methods for source control (e.g. cover their nose/mouth with tissue, 
handkerchiefs, hands or cloth masks) during coughing/sneezing or use the most practical 
alternative to contain respiratory secretions (60). Patients should be encouraged to 
perform hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions (67, 68).  
For ARDs of potential concern 
In addition to the recommendations described above, the following measures should also be 
implemented: 
Ö   The movement and transport of patients out of the isolation room/area should be for 
essential medical purposes only and avoided wherever possible (64). Use routes of 
transport that minimize exposures of staff, other patients and visitors. The receiving area 
should be informed as soon as possible prior to the patient’s arrival of the patient's 
diagnosis and of the precautions that are indicated.  
Ö    If there is patient contact with surfaces, these surfaces should be cleaned and disinfected 
afterwards (66).  
Ö    HCWs transporting ARD patients should wear appropriate PPE, followed by hand 
hygiene (64).  
 
IV.2.3.2 Pre-hospital care and transport outside HCFs 
For all ARDs 
Ö    Screen patients with severe acute febrile respiratory illness for risk factors for ARDs of 
potential concern (35, 38, 70).  
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Ö    As described for standard precautions (see Annex C), follow recommended procedures 
for disposal of waste and cleaning and disinfecting the emergency vehicle and reusable 
patient-care equipment after pre-hospital care or transport has been provided (64).  
Ö    Avoid crowding of patients during examination and in outpatient treatment areas. 
For ARDs of potential concern 
In addition to the recommendations above, the following measures also should be implemented: 
 
Ö   Unless medically necessary to support life, aerosol-generating procedures associated with 
definite risk of pathogen transmission (e.g. intubation) should be avoided during pre-
hospital care, and during transport of such patients (71, 72). (See Annex A.1). 
Ö    During transport, optimize the vehicle’s ventilation to increase the volume of air 
exchange (e.g. opening the windows). When possible, use vehicles that have separate 
driver and patient compartments. 
Ö    Notify the receiving facility as soon as possible before arrival that a patient with a 
suspected ARD of potential concern is being transported to the facility, and indicate the 
precautions that are required. 
 
IV.2.4   Duration of infection control precautions and patient discharge 
IV.2.4.1 Duration of infection control precautions 
The duration of infection control precautions varies based on the known or presumed infectious 
period of the specific ARD. 
Avian and pandemic influenza 
Infection control precautions should be implemented according to the patient's age. 
 
Ö    Adults and adolescents > 12 years of age – implement precautions at time of admission 
and continue for 7 days after symptoms have resolved (73).  
Ö    Infants and children ≤ 12 years of age – implement precautions at time of admission and 
continue for 21 days after symptom onset (young children can shed seasonal influenza 
viruses for up to 21 days)(73, 74).  
N.B. For immunocompromised patients, pathogen shedding may be protracted and there are no data to 
define the duration of infectiousness at the moment. Microbiologic monitoring to determine lack of 
pathogen delectability is advised whenever possible 
SARS 
The duration of infectivity for SARS is not well defined. Although it has been reported that the 
reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) conversion to negativity may take a long 
time (median 30 days, longest 81 days), the clinical significance of this RT-PCR conversion is not 
known. In studies conducted in China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, no SARS-CoV 
was cultured from the clinical specimens from patients proven to be infected once they were 
asymptomatic (75).  
 
Ö   In SARS patients with normal immune system function, infection control precautions 
should be implemented while patients are symptomatic (75).  
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Newly-emerging ARDs 
Ö   Implement precautions at the time of admission and continue until one  week after 
symptoms have resolved, or until there is laboratory evidence of no active infection. The 
precautions and its duration should follow the available information and the local health 
authorities' recommendations. 
 
IV.2.4.2 Discharge of patients infected with ARD of potential concern 
The following recommendations are suggested, if patients are due to be discharged while still in the 
infectious period: 
Ö    The discharge of patients should be based on the patient's clinical condition. If a patient 
with an ARD of potential concern no longer requires hospital care, the infection risk 
should be assessed. Do not discharge patients if infection control measures cannot be 
guaranteed to reduce the risk of transmission in the home setting (47, 48).  
Ö   Before discharge, carry out a verbal assessment of the patient’s home environment. A 
sample checklist is provided in Annex D. It is essential to ensure that the home 
environment is suitable to provide safe care at home.  
Ö   Family members should be educated in personal hygiene and basic infection control 
measures (e.g. cough etiquette, hand hygiene, use of PPE if necessary, and ventilation of 
rooms) (76, 77).  
Ö    Instruct the patient and the caregiver on proper hand hygiene (67, 68).  
Ö     Immunocompromised persons, pregnant women, people with chronic illness (e.g. heart, 
lung or kidney disease, and sickle cell disease), young children (< 2 years of age) and 
elderly (> 65 years of age) should not have contact with the patients until they are 
asymptomatic. Ask the patient if any household members have any of the conditions 
described above. If so, discuss alternative housing during the patient’s isolation period (78, 
79).  
Ö   Patient/caregiver(s) should be provided with instructions for follow-up clinic visits and a 
means to contact a health-care provider, if necessary (80, 81).  
 
IV.2.5 Family member/visitor recommendations 
 
Ö    Visitors should be advised about the possible risk of ARD transmission and screened 
before entering the facility (69, 82-84).  
For all ARDs 
Ö   Parents/legal guardians of paediatric patients should be supported to accompany the 
patient throughout the hospitalization (85, 86).  
Ö    Parents/relatives/legal guardians may assist in providing care to ARD patients in special 
situations (e.g. lack of resources, paediatric patients) if adequate supply and training and 
supervision of PPE use and hand hygiene are ensured (85, 87).  
For ARDs of potential concern 
In addition to the recommendations described above, the following measures also should be 
implemented: 
Ö   Visitors should use PPE according to the HCF guidance, and should be instructed in its 
use and in hand hygiene practices prior to entry into the isolation room/area (83, 88).  
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Ö    Family members and visitors with respiratory symptoms should be considered as possible 
ARD cases and should be evaluated for infection (47, 69, 83, 84, 89). 
Rationale 
The patient's right to receive visits should be guaranteed. The child's right to be accompanied by a 
parent/legal guardian should be also guaranteed. In addition to the context of visit or company, care of 
patients in isolation becomes a challenge when there are inadequate resources, and when the patient 
has poor hygienic habits or cannot be expected to assist in maintaining infection control precautions 
to limit transmission of microorganisms, and when family members are frequently involved in the 
care of the patient. In all these situations, visitors and accompanying persons should receive 
instructions for reducing infectious risk. 
 
IV.2.6 Specimen collection/transport/handling within HCFs 
All ARDs 
Ö     HCWs who collect specimens from such patients should wear PPE as indicated in 
Table 1.  
Ö     Specimens for transport must be placed in leak-proof specimen bags, which have a 
separate sealable pocket for the specimen (i.e. a plastic biohazard specimen bag), with 
patients’ label on the specimen container, and clearly written request form. For details, 
refer to Guidance on regulations for the Transport of Infectious Substances 2007-2008.1 
Ö     Personnel who transport specimens should be trained in safe handling practices and spill 
decontamination procedures.  
Ö    HCF laboratories should follow best biosafety practices according to the types of 
organisms being handled (90).  
ARDs of potential concern 
In addition to the recommendations described above, the following measures also should be 
implemented: 
Ö    All specimens should be delivered by hand where possible. Pneumatic tube systems must 
not be used to transport specimens.  
Ö     The accompanying request form should clearly state “(suspected) ARD of potential 
concern", and the laboratory should be notified by telephone or other means that the 
specimen is “on its way”. 
 
Rationale 
As outlined in Standard Precautions (see Annex C), all specimens should be regarded as potentially 
infectious, and HCWs who collect or transport clinical specimens should adhere rigorously to the 
recommended infection control precautions to minimize the possibility of exposure to pathogens. For 
further information on specimen handling and collection guidelines, see:  
−WHO laboratory biosafety guidelines for handling specimens suspected of containing avian 
influenza A virus2 
−WHO guidelines for the collection of human specimens for laboratory diagnosis of avian 
influenza infection3                                                                                                                      
For further information on laboratory biosafety guidelines, see WHO Laboratory Biosafety 
Manual.4  
                                                 
1 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_EPR_2007_2/en/index.html 
2 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/handlingspecimens/en/index.html 
3 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/humanspecimens/en/index.html 
4 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/biosafety/WHO_CDS_CSR_LYO_2004_11/en/ 
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IV.2.7 Occupational health  
IV.2.7.1 Recommendations for HCF administrators 
Ö    Whenever possible, immunize HCWs against seasonal influenza, and monitor vaccine 
uptake (91, 92).  
 
WHO guidelines for the use of seasonal influenza vaccine in humans are available from the WHO 
web site. 1  
Ö    HCWs who are at high risk for complications of ARDs of potential concern (e.g. pregnant 
women, immunocompromised persons, and persons with cardio-pulmonary or respiratory 
diseases) should be informed about the medical risks and offered work assignments that 
do not involve providing care for ARD patients (79, 93, 94). 
 
        Special recommendations for HCFs managing patients with ARDs of potential concern 
Ö    Keep a register of HCWs who have provided care for patients with ARDs of potential 
concern for contact tracing. 
Ö   Develop a HCW influenza-like illness (ILI) surveillance system. HCWs with ILI should 
be excluded from high-risk units (e.g. neonatal intensive care unit, haemopoietic stem cell 
transplantation unit).  
Ö   Develop a system to monitor HCWs' health, especially in HCWs providing care for 
patients with ARDs of potential concern, with self-reporting by symptomatic HCWs (see 
Annex E). Provide prompt access, to diagnosis, counselling and treatment if these are 
available.  
Ö    If antiviral prophylaxis is recommended by local policy, HCF administrators should 
develop a system to provide antiviral prophylaxis to HCWs exposed to patients with 
ARDs of potential concern accordingly. If necessary, the HCF administration should 
contact public health officials for assistance in obtaining adequate supplies for 
prophylaxis of HCWs providing care for patients with ARDs of potential concern, in line 
local guidance. Details of appropriate use of antiviral prophylaxis are provided in WHO 
Rapid Advice Guidelines on pharmacological management of humans infected with avian 
influenza A (H5N1) virus.2 
Ö    Ensure that HCWs (especially those taking care of patients with ARDs of potential 
concern) have timely access to newly-developed vaccines to prevent acquisition of ARDs 
of concern.  
Ö    Develop methods to provide additional support to HCWs (e.g. emotional and family 
support), as necessary.  
 
IV.2.7.2  Recommendations for HCWs who have provided care for patients known or 
suspected to be infected with an ARD of potential concern 
Ö   Organize HCWs into groups designated for caring for patients and check HCWs' 
temperature regularly (e.g. before each work shift), and monitor for symptoms of ILI 
(cough, sore throat, difficulty in breathing) for 7–10 days after last possible exposure to a 
patient with ARD of potential concern (see Annex E) (63).  
                                                 
1 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/seasonal_vaccine/en/ 
2 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/guidelines/pharmamanagement/en/index.html 
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Ö      In the event of fever > 38°C, or the development of ILI, HCWs should immediately limit 
their interactions with others, be kept out of work, exclude themselves from public areas, 
and notify the infection control/occupational health team (and/or their health-care 
provider) that they are symptomatic and have had contact with patients with an ARD of 
potential concern (63, 95).  
 
Rationale 
HCWs also are members of the community, and during seasonal or pandemic influenza outbreaks 
they can become infected with influenza either through exposure in the community or in the HCF (not 
necessarily as a result of patient exposure). Once infected, they can serve as sources of virus 
transmission to other staff and to their patients, who are at increased risk of complications associated 
with ARD. While seasonal influenza vaccine does not provide protection against new influenza 
viruses, such as avian influenza, it will help to prevent concurrent infection with seasonal human 
influenza and thus reduce confusion in diagnosis and un-necessary work furlough. Prevention of 
seasonal influenza would also theoretically minimize the possibility of reassortment human and novel 
influenza viruses within the immunized HCW. Antibody responses usually are developed within 2 
weeks after vaccination with seasonal influenza vaccine in adults. In addition, HCWs who provide 
care for any patient with an ARD of potential concern may potentially be exposed to these pathogens, 
and should be monitored and supported as needed. 
 
  IV.3  Engineering and environmental control for ARDs 
IV.3.1 Placement of patients with ARDs  
 
Ö    Patients infected with a novel organism causing ARD with potential to have a high public 
health impact should be placed in airborne precaution rooms (≥ 12 ACH plus safe air flow; 
see in section V). Patients infected with other ARDs of potential concern (e.g. SARS, 
human cases of avian influenza) should be accommodated in adequately ventilated (≥ 12 
ACH) single rooms.  
Ö    If airborne precaution rooms are not available for patients infected with a novel organism 
causing ARD, adequately ventilated single rooms should be given to these patients. If 
possible, rooms used for isolation of ARDs of potential concern (single rooms or airborne 
precaution rooms) should be in an area that is clearly segregated from other patient-care 
areas (21, 55, 66, 96).  
Ö    Spaces reserved for triage, waiting rooms, areas used for aerosol-generating procedures 
associated with pathogen transmission, and adequately ventilated single rooms should 
present a minimal ventilation rate of 12 ACH (1).  
 
Rationale 
Patient placement should be planned according to: 
 the presence in patients of epidemiological and clinical clues of ARDs of potential 
concern; 
 the precautions undertaken in addition to Standard Precautions for the suspected or 
confirmed causative agents; and 
 availability of facilities. 
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Airborne precaution rooms should be prioritized for patients with obligate or preferential airborne 
infections (e.g. pulmonary tuberculosis, measles and chickenpox) and for patients infected with novel 
agents causing ARD of potential concern with no information on possible routes of transmission. 
Opportunistic transmission of ARDs through droplet nuclei at short range may occur during aerosol-
generating procedures associated with increased risk of pathogen transmission (see Annex A.1) under 
special situations, (e.g. inadequate use of PPE, poor environmental ventilation). The need to perform 
these procedures in ARD patients in airborne precaution rooms has not been sufficiently evaluated. 
Therefore, HCFs that have airborne precaution rooms should use them according to local policies. At 
the time of this publication, this remains an unresolved issue, and no specific recommendation can be 
given.  
 
See section IV.2.2 for cohorting and special measures. For details of isolation precautions, see Annex 
C, and for details of isolation rooms, see Annex F. 
 
IV.3.2  Design of triage and waiting areas  
Ö   Triage and waiting areas need to be adequately ventilated with at least 12 ACH (1).  
Ö    Organize the space and process to permit distance (≥ 1 m) between waiting patients and 
rapid triage of patients with acute febrile respiratory diseases, and screen them for risk 
factors associated with ARDs of potential concern (35, 55, 59). 
Ö     The waiting room/area should be adequately cleaned and disinfected after placement of 
patients suspected or confirmed to have ARDs of potential concern (35, 66).  
IV.3.3  Corridors 
Ö    Corridors with frequent patient transport should be well-ventilated (97).  
 
  IV.4  PPE use 
 
Ö    PPE should be used in the context of other prevention and control strategies (98), and in 
accordance with infection control recommendations (e.g. Standard, Contact, Droplet, or 
Airborne Precautions) (64).  
Ö    Monitor compliance by HCWs of proper use of PPE (e.g. by using observers). This is 
particularly important when caring for patients with ARDs of potential concern.  
Ö    Appropriate training on use of PPE should be provided (56, 98-102).  
For details of preparation of isolation room/area and wearing and removing of PPE, refer to Annex F. 
 
IV.4.1  Rational use of PPE  
Ö    Provision of appropriate PPE supplies should be a national and institutional priority (56, 
99, 101, 102).  
Ö   Reuse of disposable PPE items should be avoided. It is not known whether reusing 
disposable PPE provides the same protective efficacy and safety as using new PPE and 
reuse may increase the risk of infection in HCWs (103, 104).  
Ö    If resources are limited and disposable PPE items are not available, use reusable items 
(e.g. disinfectable cotton gowns), and properly disinfect after each use (66).  
Ö   To avoid wastage, evaluate critically situations in which PPE is indicated using the 
rationale provided in Table 1, and maximize clinical care provision during each entry to 
the patient's room (64).  
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         Respiratory protection  
Ö    If patients with ARDs known or suspected to be airborne are cohorted in a common area 
or in several rooms on a nursing unit, and multiple patients will be visited, it may be 
practical for a HCW to wear one particulate respirator for the duration of the activity. This 
type of use requires that the respirator is not removed at any time during the activity and 
that the user does not touch the respirator. If the respirator gets wet or dirty with 
secretions, it must be changed immediately.  
Ö    Specific training on how to put on the respirator, perform the seal check every time the 
respirator is worn, avoid contamination during use, and remove and dispose of the 
respirator is necessary to ensure compliance with correct respirator use (105).  
Ö    If supplies are limited, use of particulate respirators should be prioritized for providing 
care for patients with obligate and preferential airborne-transmitted diseases, HCWs 
performing aerosol-generating procedures associated with documented risk of pathogen 
transmission (AnnexA,Table 6). If a particulate respirator is not available, performance of 
aerosol-generating procedures associated with a documented increased risk of pathogen 
transmission should be avoided in patients with ARDs of potential concern whenever 
possible (71, 72, 84, 106, 107).  
         Medical masks  
Ö     Medical masks should fit the user's face tightly and be discarded immediately after use 
(108, 109). If the mask gets wet or dirty with secretions, it must be changed immediately. 
         Gloves 
Ö     If supplies of gloves are limited, reserve gloves for situations where there is a likelihood 
of contact with blood, respiratory secretions, or body fluids, including during aerosol-
generating procedures associated with definite risk of pathogen transmission (102, 110, 
111).  
        Gowns  
Ö   If supplies of HCW gowns are limited, gown use should be prioritized for use when 
performing aerosol-generating procedures associated with definite risk of pathogen 
transmission and for activities that involve holding the patient close (e.g. in paediatric 
settings), or when other extensive direct patient contact is anticipated (102, 110).  
Ö    If there is a shortage of HCW gowns, HCW gowns also may be worn in the care of more 
than one patient in a cohort area only, and if the gown does not enter in direct contact with 
the patient.  
         Eye protection 
Ö    Conventional eye glasses are not designed to protect against splashes to eye mucosa, and 
should not be used as eye protection. 
Ö    Reusable eye protective equipment can be used (e.g. goggles, face shield). However, it 
may pose a potential risk of cross-infection if not cleaned and decontaminated properly 
after each use according to manufacturer’s instructions (56). Cleaning must precede 
disinfection (112-117). Hand hygiene must be performed after disposal or cleaning of eye 
protection equipment which may be contaminated with splash/spray (67, 68).  
 
Rationale 
PPE is meant to provide protection for the user but should not result in increased risk for other 
individuals or the environment. PPE supplies may be limited, and reuse of PPE items unavoidable, but 
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such reuse should be performed under safe conditions. In addition, unnecessary use of PPE should be 
avoided. 
 
IV.5  Care of the deceased  
IV.5.1 Removal of the body from the isolation room/area 
 
Ö    According to Standard Precautions, PPE use should be applied to avoid direct contact 
with body fluids (64).  
Ö   Cultural sensitivity should be practised. If the family of the patient wishes to view the 
body after removal from the isolation room/area, they may be allowed to do so, and 
Standard Precautions should be applied (64). See details of recommended PPE and 
procedures for body packing and transport in Annex G. 
IV.5.2 Mortuary care  
 
Ö    Mortuary staff and the burial team should apply Standard Precautions i.e. perform proper 
hand hygiene and use appropriate PPE (use of gown, gloves, facial protection if there is a 
risk of splashes from patient's body fluids/secretions onto staff's body and face) (64, 67, 
68, 118, 119).  
Ö    Embalming may be conducted according to usual routine, subject to local 
regulations/legislation.  
Ö   Hygienic preparation of the deceased (e.g. cleaning of body, tidying of hair, trimming of 
nails, and shaving) also may be conducted with the application of Standard Precautions 
(64).  
Rationale 
Transmission of lethal infectious diseases associated with mortuary care has been reported (120). 
However, the cultural context of the local community also should be respected (121). It is essential to 
assess the risk during the mortuary care process, providing adequate explanation to the family. If 
indicated, PPE should be provided to the family after instruction in its use. Each family should be 
managed on a case-by-case basis, balancing their rights with the risks of exposure to infection. 
 
IV.5.3  Postmortem examination  
Ö     Post-mortem examinations and collection of samples for microbiologic analyses are 
essential to better understanding of ARDs. On the other hand, they are associated with 
risk of transmitting infections, and should be performed when necessary, and if safety 
measures are in place (see Annex G). 
Ö   Appropriate safety measures to protect the persons performing the examination should be 
put into place in advance (122-124) (see Annex G). 
Ö    A minimum number of staff should be involved in the procedure. It should only be 
performed if (125, 126):  
− a well-ventilated room suitable for the procedure is available; and 
− appropriate PPE is available. For details of PPE suggested, and how to put on 
and take off PPE, refer to Annex G. 
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IV.5.4  Engineering and environmental controls for autopsy  
 
Ö   Perform autopsies in well-ventilated rooms with ACH ≥ 12 (127).  
Ö   Minimize aerosols in the autopsy room (e.g. during lung excision) by: 
− avoiding the use of power saws whenever possible (128, 129);  
− avoiding splashes when removing, handling, and/or washing organs, 
especially lung tissue and the intestines (128, 129);  
− using exhaust ventilation to contain aerosols and reduce the volume of 
aerosols released into the ambient air environment. Exhaust systems around 
the autopsy table should direct air and aerosols away from HCWs performing 
the procedure (e.g. exhaust downward) (129-131).  
 
For details of how to reduce aerosol generation with modification of equipment, refer to Annex G. 
 
Ö    Surfaces that have become contaminated with tissues or body fluids should be cleaned and 
decontaminated by (126): 
− removing most of the tissue or body substance with absorbent materials; 
− cleaning surfaces with water and detergent; 
− applying the disinfectant standardized by the HCF. If sodium hypochlorite 
solution is used (see Annex H, Table 7), wet the surface with the solution and 
allow at least 10 minutes contact time; and  




Safety procedures for the deceased infected with an ARD of potential concern should be consistent 
with those used for any autopsy procedure. In general, the acknowledged hazards of work in the 
autopsy room seem to arise from contact with infectious materials, and particularly with splashes onto 
body surfaces of HCWs, rather than from inhalation of infectious material. However, if a patient with 
an ARD of potential concern died during the infectious period, the lungs and other organs may still 
contain live virus, and additional respiratory protection is needed during procedures that generate 
small-particle aerosols (e.g. use of power saws, washing intestines). Therefore, postmortem 
examinations of patients with ARDs of potential concern deserve special caution with regard to the 
environment. 
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V. Environmental ventilation for respiratory infections 
It has been demonstrated that in a well-designed well-ventilated room with effective removal of 
contaminated air, the decay in the concentration of infective droplet nuclei in the room can reduce the 
risk of infection for individuals. The quality of ventilation is one of the major factors in determining 
the risk of exposure in the isolation room (132). Therefore, it is important to consider the various 
available methods to achieve adequate ventilation of areas that are used for isolating patients with 
potentially airborne ARDs. In these guidelines, the term “airborne precaution room” is adopted to 
designate a room with ≥ 12 ACH and desired air flow direction, which may be achieved with natural 
or mechanical ventilation. Such a room can be used to isolate patients with infected with airborne 
pathogens (e.g. pulmonary tuberculosis, measles, chickenpox) and ARDs caused by a novel agent of 
potential concern before routes of transmission are clarified. The airborne precaution rooms can be 
naturally or mechanically ventilated. On the other hand, if a room is well ventilated (≥ 12 ACH) but 
the air flow is not ascertained, it is designated in this document as an “adequately ventilated single 
room”.  
 
Although the standard for adequate ventilation in isolation rooms has been suggested as 12 ACH (1-3), 
the actual infection risk reduction deserves further evaluation. It is the ventilation rate (i.e. ACH) in a 
room or space that is important when droplet nuclei transmission is a concern. Table 2 provides 
information about how the ventilation rates relate to the decay of droplet nuclei concentrations in an 
isolation room with different ventilation rates, using the concentration decay equation (133). The 
assumptions for this equation are: 1) the ACH remains constant; and 2) the concentration of droplet 
nuclei in the enclosed space is uniform (normally not the case in the real-life situation). Applying the 
concentration decay equation, there is 10-fold dilution within 10 minutes with 15 ACH. Because the 
quantity or an amount of particle generation is not uniform in health care settings, adequate 
ventilation may reduce but not eliminate the risk of infection, and thus appropriate PPE is indicated. 
 
 
Table 2.  Decay in concentration of droplet nuclei in enclosed isolation rooms with different 
rates and duration of  environmental ventilation (133) 
 
% decay in concentration of droplet nuclei at                         
ventilation rates (ACH) of:   Duration of  
ventilation 
  (min) 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 
0 10.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
5 60.7 47.2 36.8 28.7 22.37 17.4 13.5 
10 36.8 22.3 13.5 8.2 5.0 3.0 1.8 
15 22.3 10.5 5.0 2.4 1.1 0.5 0.3 
20 13.5 5.0 1.8 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.0 
25 8.2 2.4 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 
30 5.0 1.1 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
35 3.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
40 1.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
45 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
50 0.7 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
60 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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V.1 General concepts and principles 
V.1.1  Types of environmental ventilation and factors governing the choice of 
ventilation methods 
 
There are three main types of ventilation: 
1. Mechanical ventilation uses fans to drive the air flow through a building. Mechanical 
ventilation can be combined with air conditioning and filtration systems as is normally done 
in some buildings.  
2. Natural ventilation uses natural forces to drive the air flow through a building. Natural 
forces are wind pressures, and pressures generated by the density differences between 
indoor and outdoor air, the so-called “chimney effect.”  
3. Mixed-mode ventilation system combines the use of both mechanical and natural ventilation 
and provides the opportunity to choose the most appropriate ventilation mode based on the 
circumstances (134). It is mainly used in modern commercial buildings, and requires 
expertise in design and construction. 
 
The main factors that govern the choice of the ventilation method to be employed in HCFs are: 
 
 Efficacy of the method to meet the minimal ACH requirement 
− The necessary ACH to help prevent transmission of infectious pathogens through 
droplet nuclei is suggested to be 12 ACH (1).  
− Both mechanical and well-designed natural ventilation systems can meet effective 
minimal requirements.  
− Despite being more easily controlled, mechanical ventilation may not be available 
everywhere, especially in areas or HCFs with limited resources. 
− New developments in natural ventilation have greatly benefited from engineers 
designing effective ventilation systems. With better design and control, natural 
ventilation has become more reliable in terms of its performance, and can be effective 
in preventing the transmission of potentially airborne agents. See Annex B for designs 
of natural ventilation (135-137).  
 HCF infrastructure 
− In existing HCFs that are totally mechanically ventilated with central ventilation 
systems, the installation of additional controls in isolation rooms (e.g. adequate ACH) 
may be the best choice among different types of ventilation. Opening windows in a 
mechanically-ventilated room not designed for natural ventilation is undesirable 
because the system is not designed for this practice and the ventilation features are not 
predictable.  
− In existing HCFs without mechanical ventilation systems, effective ventilation may be 
achieved through adaptation of the existing designs using natural ventilation alone, or in 
combination with exhaust fans. 
− The planning of HCFs may benefit from recent developments in natural ventilation 
strategies. After careful assessment, less expensive and more effective systems may be 
useful for a wide range of HCFs. 
 Climatic conditions 
− The effectiveness of natural ventilation depends on the existence of sufficient wind 
speed and/or the ambient temperature in the environment external to the facility (138). 
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Areas with extremes of temperature and consistently low wind speed may preclude the 
use of natural ventilation. 
 
 






Mechanical ventilation Natural ventilation 
 
   Suitable for all climates and 
weather 
  More controlled and 
comfortable environment 
  Lower capital, operational, and 
maintenance costs 
  Capable of achieving very high 
ventilation rate for immediate complete 
removal of indoor pollutants 




  Expensive to install and 
maintain 
  Requires expertise 
 
  More difficult to predict, analyse, and 
design 
  Reduces comfort level of occupants 
when weather is hostile, i.e. too hot, 
humid or cold 
  Not possible to establish negative 
pressure in isolation areas if needed 
  Risk of exposure to insects or  vectors 
 
V.2  Use of natural ventilation in isolation rooms 
 
The principle of natural ventilation is to allow and enhance the flow of outdoor air by natural forces 
such as wind and thermal buoyancy forces from one opening to another to achieve the desirable ACH. 
Before the advent of central ventilation and air conditioning, hospital wards, including treatment areas 
for tuberculosis patients, were all naturally ventilated (139). A recent evaluation of natural ventilation 
strategies in Peru showed that natural ventilation was effective in reducing nosocomial transmission 
of tuberculosis (140).  
 
For isolation room applications, there are two major concerns with natural ventilation: 
 The rate of ACH provided by natural ventilation is variable. 
 Negative pressure is suggested for Airborne Precautions (2-4), and natural ventilation 
may not be able to create negative pressure.  
 
Although in naturally-ventilated rooms, the ACH can vary significantly, buildings with modern 
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by natural forces, greatly exceeding the minimum requirements of 12 ACH. In a study conducted in 
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (Table 4), the ACH in a ward with an open 
window and open door was shown to be very high (personal communication: Qian, H, Seto WH, and 
Li Y).  
 
 
      Table 4.   Air changes per hour (ACH) in a naturally-ventilated room  
                      observed in an experiment in China, Hong Kong SAR  
 
Room conditions ACH 
 
 Completely open window + open door       29.3–93.2 
Completely open window  + closed door       15.1–31.4 
 Half-open window + closed door       10.5–24 
 Closed window + open door         8.8 
                
                  *Personal communication, Qian, H, Seto WH, and Li Y, The University of Hong Kong 
                    and Queen Mary Hospital. 
 
With mechanical ventilation, the negative pressure environment in the isolation room is suggested as a 
means to generate an inward air flow (3). In the absence of negative pressure, the air flow may be 
multidirectional, in and out of a naturally-ventilated airborne precaution room. However, naturally-
ventilated airborne precaution rooms can be designed to provide a desired airflow direction, which is 
from patient-caring areas to areas free of transit, or permitting the rapid dilution of contaminated air 
into the surrounding areas and the open air.  
 
The choice of isolation areas and placement of patients within the facility need to be carefully planned 
and designed to further reduce the risk of infection for people in the surroundings (141). When 
designing a HCF, it is best if the isolation areas are away from other parts of the hospital, and are built 
in places predicted to have good prevailing winds year round. The air should be directed from patient-
caring areas to outside open areas not regularly used for transit of persons. Inside the airborne 
precaution room, the patient should be placed near the exterior wall, close to open window(s), instead 
of close to the inner wall. Figure 2 depicts an airborne precaution room with natural ventilation 
achieved by opening the windows and the door to the corridor.  
 
Another consideration associated with the use of natural ventilation is exposure of patients to 
arthropod vectors (e.g. mosquitoes) in endemic areas. Use of mosquito nets and other vector 
preventive measures may help to reduce the risk of transmission of vector-borne diseases.  
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Figure 2.   Illustration of the desired direction of air flow in a properly designed naturally-
ventilated isolation room (achieved by opening the windows, and the door 
between the isolation room and the corridor)  
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V.3  Use of exhaust fans in isolation rooms 
 
Rapid creation of temporary isolation wards using exhaust fans was practised during the SARS 
outbreaks (142). The major purpose of installing exhaust fans is to assist in increasing the ACH to the 
desirable level and creating negative pressure (54, 143). However, careful design and planning, and an 
adequate number of exhaust fans are needed to achieve such results. The environmental ventilation 
rates achieved by installation of exhaust fans in an isolation room with different room conditions are 
shown in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 5.  Ventilation rates (ACH) in a naturally-ventilated room observed in an  




The door connecting 
the room to the corridor 
is: 
The door and windows 
connecting room to the 
balcony and outside air 
is: 
ACH 
Off Closed Closed       0.71 
Off Closed Open     14.0 
Off Open Open       8.8–18.5 
On Closed Closed      12.6 
On Closed Open      14.6 
On Open Open       29.2 
*Personal communication, WH Seto, Department of Microbiology, The University of Hong Kong and Queen Mary 
Hospital. 
 
In countries where natural ventilation is not suitable, and fully mechanically-ventilated airborne 
precaution rooms cannot be installed due to limited resources, the use of exhaust fans (with adequate 
pre-testing and planning) may help to increase ACH rates and generate negative pressure in the rooms. 
The fans should be installed on exterior wall(s) where room air can be exhausted directly to the 
outdoor environment free of transit of persons. The size and number of exhaust fans needed depend 
on the targeted ACH, which must be measured and tested before use.  
 
The shortcomings associated with the use of exhaust fans include installation difficulties (especially 
for large fans), noise associated with high-power fans, uncertainties in effects on the existing air 
conditioning system and temperature control in the room. 
  
  V.4  Use of mechanical ventilation in isolation rooms 
 
HCFs using mechanically-ventilated airborne precaution rooms should warrant the necessary controls 
to achieve adequate ventilation rate and controlled direction of air flow. Mechanically-ventilated 
airborne precaution rooms are equivalent to the 'Airborne Infection Isolation Room' described by 
CDC (US) (4).  Specific guidelines for environmental mechanical ventilation are available and state 
that a mechanically-ventilated airborne precaution room should be a private room that has (1, 4):  
 
 monitored negative air pressure in relation to the surrounding areas;  
 12 ACH; and  
 appropriate discharge of air outdoors, or monitored high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) 
filtration  of room air before it is recirculated to other areas in the hospital. 
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The room door must be kept closed and the patient should remain in the room. Figure 3 depicts an 
example of an ideal mechanically-ventilated airborne precaution room1.  
 
 






V.5  Conclusions 
 
 The types of environmental ventilation should be carefully considered when designing a 
HCF. Ventilation is an important control strategy for diseases possibly transmitted through 
droplet nuclei, and its benefits are applicable not only to isolation purposes, but in several 
areas of the HCF (3).  
 If the airborne precaution room is mechanically ventilated, it is important to ensure that the 
ventilation system is functioning properly through regular monitoring. 
 There are insufficient data on the impact of different types of ventilation on the reduction of 
infectious risks. The comparability between the types of ventilation regarding their 
effectiveness is yet to be defined. 
                                                 
1 For more details, please refer to http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/gl_environinfection.html 
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VI. HCF preparedness planning for ARD epidemics 
The recent SARS outbreak and the threat of an influenza pandemic have highlighted the importance 
of communicable disease preparedness activities. HCFs should prepare for communicable disease 
emergencies through (144-147):  
 organizing permanent infection control activities, surveillance and training of dedicated 
personnel and clinical staff; 
 creating a multidisciplinary HCF group to develop a preparedness plan;  
 developing a HCF preparedness plan; 
 performing a plan evaluation, monitoring exercise , and updating; and 
 strengthening liaison with other levels of the health care system/public health authorities.  
 
Rationale 
If the initial containment of a new epidemic/pandemic-prone respiratory virus fails, and given that 
most people will have no immunity against such a pathogen, a substantial proportion of the population, 
including HCWs, may fall ill and require different levels of health care. This will pose a challenge to 
manage patients and to contain the risk of spread associated with heath care. Preparedness of HCFs is 
considered an essential part of general pandemic preparedness plans (148, 149). The main goals are: 
 identifying, isolating and reporting early cases of a putative epidemic/pandemic ARD virus; 
 keeping the health-care system functioning for pandemic and non-pandemic patients; and 
 reducing the risk of pandemic ARD transmission associated with health care. 
 
HCF capacity to respond efficiently to epidemic or pandemic threats at any given moment is highly 
dependant on existing standards of practice. The implementation of additional measures during the 
outbreak setting is very challenging, and the lack of baseline good standards may hamper 
epidemic/pandemic response efforts. Thus, preparedness for response to an ARD pandemic threat lies 
in a continuous strengthening of early detection of episodes and safe care in the HCF. Promotion of 
routine Standard Precautions in health care is the cornerstone of reducing the spread of pathogens, and 
should be enhanced worldwide to help HCF preparedness for a potential pandemic. 
 
VI.1 Components of HCF pandemic ARD preparedness plans 
 
HCF pandemic ARD preparedness plans should take into account the geographical location of the 
HCF and the progress of the pandemic, and include actions to be taken before, during and after the 
pandemic event. Plans should address: 
 
a.  Surveillance 
 Make it a facility priority to establish methods to ensure early recognition and investigation 
of possible pandemic ARD patients (31, 32).  
 Link the hospital-based infectious diseases surveillance system to the public health 
infectious diseases surveillance system, and report immediately all available essential 
information regarding possible pandemic ARD cases to public health authorities via the 
local surveillance system, as per Annex 1 of the International Health Regulations (2005)1  
 Public health authorities should also keep HCFs informed about the ongoing epidemics. 
                                                 
1 Available at: http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/WHA58/A58_55-en.pdf 
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 For preparedness of pandemic influenza, in addition to the above, HCFs should: 
− enhance ILI surveillance (see Annex E) (144, 150);  
− define criteria that would shift surveillance of episodes of influenza  of potential 
concern (e.g. human episodes of avian influenza) from passive to active (144, 147, 151).  
 
b.  Triage within HCFs 
 Organize front-line services (e.g. Emergency Department) to perform triage of patients with 
respiratory symptoms (35, 151).  
 Promptly initiate infection control precautions when a possible epidemic/pandemic ARD 
episode is suspected (33, 148, 152).  
 
c.  Plan for surge capacity 
 HCFs should plan for surge capacity according to the estimated impact of a potential 
pandemic on health care (see Annex I for estimates) (153-157).  
 HCFs also should outline the limits of their surge capacity (e.g. human and space capacities) 
to provide care, and suggest thresholds when alternative sites for provision of health care 
(off-site care facilities) should be implemented (153-157).  
 
d.  Surge capacity needs should be outlined regarding (153-157):  
 supplies (pharmaceuticals, PPE, etc.); 
 ventilators, supplemental oxygen; 
 staff: develop plans to maintain sufficient personnel to carry out HCF activities (e.g. by 
planning alternative shifts/staffing assignments, supplemental staffing plan);  
 HCF infrastructure; 
 laboratory and diagnostic capacity; and 
 security policies to handle an unexpected increase in demand for services. 
 
e.  Establish policies for access to the HCF (82) for 
 the public 
 visitors (those who are allowed to enter should be educated on respiratory hygiene and risk 
of disease transmission, and screened/surveyed for ARDs) 
 HCWs (HCW flow); and 
 patients (patient flow). 
 
f.  Risk communication policy (158)  
 within HCF 
 with other HCFs 
 with other public health bodies, government agencies and ministries 
 with other societal bodies (e.g. media, professional societies, nongovernmental 
organizations). 
 
g.  Infection control measures 
 Engage HCWs in prioritization of resources and training (e.g. PPE/PPE use). 
 Engage HCWs into process of work in order to decrease the infection risk. 
 Reinforce Standard Precautions (Annex C) to promote a culture of safe practices (101). 
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 Educate HCWs about pandemic ARDs: main pathogens, epidemiology, morbidity, routes of 
transmission, how to break the chain of transmission, and PPE use (risk assessment, proper 
ways to put on and take off, and safe disposal) (54, 55, 95, 105).  
 Plan HCF areas to be used for pandemic ARD patients. 
 Apply infection control precautions according to pandemic pathogen (see Table 1) (64, 159).  
 Define duration of isolation precautions according to the causative pathogen (73, 74).  
 Specimen collection/transport/handling within HCF: HCWs should use infection control 
precautions according to pandemic pathogen (Table 1) for specimen collection.  Use 
Standard Precautions for specimen transport to the laboratory.  All laboratories should 
follow the appropriate biosafety practices (160).  
 Define safe patient transport within HCF and between HCFs. 
 
h.  Occupational health programme 
 Monitor and support for HCWs' health. 
 Consider appropriate vaccination (e.g. seasonal influenza vaccine) (149, 161, 162).  
 Consider vaccination against new ARD of potential concern when available. 
 Provide antiviral prophylaxis, if available (163-165).  
 ILI surveillance among HCWs should be emphasized and may help to provide early signals 
of human-to-human transmission of a new ARD agent (161). 
 Treat and follow up epi/pandemic ARD-infected HCWs (163, 166).  
 Plan staff reassignment according to risk assessment (79, 93, 94, 167).  
 Provide psychosocial support.  
 
i.  Patient flow within the HCF and discharge planning 
 Heighten awareness of the ARD’s clinical presentation during an outbreak period to 
enhance early recognition of possible cases (35). 
 Plan a safe patient flow of patients to help prevent dissemination of ARD pathogens (35). 
 Plan the discharge of patients based on patient’s clinical conditions, assessment of patient’s 
home conditions and capability of home caregivers to comply with instructions (see 
IV.2.4.2 for details). 
 
j.  Mortuary 
 Mass fatalities/how to conduct burials. 
 Cultural/religious aspects should be taken into consideration (121).  
 
k.  Promotion of outpatient care of ARD patients in the event of pandemic  
HCFs should liaise with the health-care system (e.g. community health centres) to help 
support outpatient care when the patient needs higher levels of care. Likewise, acute care 
HCFs may refer patients to ambulatory care facilities for diagnosis, treatment and follow-up, 
according to the patient’s clinical status (147). For additional information about infection 
control across the continuum of health care, see Annex J. 
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Annex A.  Respiratory protection 
A.1 High-risk aerosol-generating procedures 
 
Aerosols are produced when air currents moves across the surface of a film of liquid, generating small 
particles at the air–liquid interface. The particle size is inversely related to the velocity of air. 
Therefore, if a procedure causes air to travel at high velocity over the respiratory mucosa and 
epithelium, there is potential risk of the production of tiny aerosols (e.g. droplet nuclei). 
An aerosol-generating procedure is defined as any procedure on a patient that can induce the 
production of aerosols of various sizes, including droplet nuclei. Several medical procedures have 
been reported to generate aerosols (71, 72, 100, 107, 143, 168-178), and some were suggested to be 
associated with increased risk of pathogen transmission (Table 6) (71, 72, 100, 107, 130, 143, 168, 
169, 171, 172, 174-182). Many of the latter studies have significant methodological flaws that 
preclude the use of their conclusions to draw recommendations. In fact, the risk associated with many 
of the aerosol-generating procedures is not yet well-defined, and the understanding of the aerosol-
generating procedures' aerobiology may change and evolve with further studies in the area. Table 6 
describes some of the studies evaluating the infection risk associated with these procedures. For the 
purpose of this document, the term “aerosol-generating procedure associated with documented 
increase in risk of pathogen transmission” refers to the performance of the following procedures in 
ARD patients: 
 intubation and related procedures (e.g. manual ventilation, suctioning) (71, 72, 169); 
 cardiopulmonary resuscitation (169);  
 bronchoscopy (174, 175);  
 surgery and autopsy (130, 178).  
 
Table 6 .  Risk of transmission of respiratory pathogens during aerosol-generating   
procedures 
 
Procedure Ref no. Type of study 
 
Documented increase in risk of 
respiratory pathogen transmission 
  
o Intubation, cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation and related 
procedures (e.g. manual 
ventilation, suction) 
(71, 169, 179) Epidemiological studies on 
tuberculosis and SARS 
o Bronchoscopy (174, 175) Epidemiological studies on 
tuberculosis 
o Autopsy/surgery  (130, 178) Epidemiological studies on 
tuberculosis 
Controversial/possible increase in risk 
of respiratory pathogen transmission 
  
o Non-invasive positive-
pressure ventilation and 
bilevel positive airway 
pressure  
(71, 107) Epidemiological studies on 
SARS 
o High-frequency oscillating 
ventilation  
(71) Epidemiological studies on 
SARS 
o Nebulization  (107) Epidemiological studies 
on SARS 
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Additional precautions for HCWs performing aerosol-generating procedures on ARD patients appear 
warranted (183).  
A.1.1 PPE for aerosol-generating procedures 
 PPE should cover the torso, arms, hands, eyes, nose, and mouth, and should include long-
sleeved gown, single-use gloves, eye protection (e.g. goggle, face shield) and respiratory 
protection. Use of a hair cover is optional. 
 A particulate respirator at least as protective as a NIOSH-certified N95, EU FFP2 or 
equivalent (see section A2 for details) is the minimum level of respiratory protection 
required for HCWs performing aerosol-generating procedures associated with a 
documented increased risk of respiratory pathogen transmission. 
 
A.1.2 Environmental controls for aerosol-generating procedures 
 Perform the procedure in an adequately-ventilated single room and away from other 
patients. 
 For ARD of potential concern patients receiving high flow oxygen supplement or non-
invasive positive pressure ventilation, addition of an expiratory port with a bacterial/viral 
filter (e.g. HEPA filter) can reduce aerosol emission. 
 For ARD of potential concern patients receiving intermittent positive pressure ventilation, 
bacterial/viral filters (e.g. HEPA filters) could be attached to the expiratory ports of the 
ventilations and, whenever possible, use a closed tracheal suctioning system for aspiration 
of respiratory secretions. 
 
A.2 Selection of respiratory protection equipment 
 
Particulate respirators 
 HCWs caring for patients infected with an organism of unknown transmission mode, or 
known or suspected airborne pathogen, or when undertaking aerosol-generating procedures, 
should select the highest level of respiratory protection equipment available, preferably a 
particulate respirator.  
 The fit and seal of disposable particulate respirators is important for effective function. If 
there is not a good fit and seal, airborne particles may be inhaled from leaks, and the 
particulate respirator may not be effective.  
 Particulate respirator wearers should be trained how to use the device (e.g. putting on of 
respirator, avoidance of self-contamination during use and upon removal, and ways to 
achieve the best seal) (105). The application of fit testing to improve HCWs' ability to 
comply with adequate use of respirators has been evaluated and has not been shown to be 
an effective means to improve compliance. Hospitals should follow local regulations 
regarding the regular performance of the fit test.  
 A user seal check should be performed each time a disposable particulate respirator is worn 
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Cup the respirator in your hand with the nosepiece at your 
fingertips allowing the headbands to hang freely below your hand  
Position the respirator under your chin with the nosepiece up
Pull the top strap over your head resting it high at the back of 
your head. Pull the bottom strap over your head and position 
it around the neck below the ears 
Place fingertips of both hands at the top of the metal nosepiece.  
Mould the nosepiece (USING TWO FINGERS OF EACH HAND) to 
the shape of your nose. Pinching the nosepiece using one hand 
may result in less effective respirator performance 
Cover the front of the respirator with both hands, being careful 
not to disturb the position of respirator
5A  Positive seal check 
- Exhale sharply. A positive 
pressure inside the respirator = 
no leakage.  If leakage, adjust 
position and/or tension straps.  
Retest the seal. 
- Repeat the steps until 
respirator is sealed properly 
5B  Negative seal check 
- Inhale deeply.  If no leakage, 
negative pressure will make 
respirator cling to your face. 
- Leakage will result in loss of 
negative pressure in the 
respirator due to air entering 
through gaps in the seal 
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 Facial hair impedes good fit, and seal may not be achieved, decreasing the efficiency of the 
particulate respirator. HCWs with facial structure abnormalities also may be unable to 
obtain a good seal and need alternative approaches for respiratory protection. 
 Examples of acceptable disposable particulate respirators in use in various parts of the 
world include: 
−Australia/New Zealand: P2 (94%), P3 (99.95%) 
−China: II (95%), I (99%) 
−European Union: CE-certified filtering face-piece class 2 (FFP2) (95%), or class 3 
(FFP3) (99.7%) 
−Japan: 2nd class (95%), 3rd class (99.9%) 
−Republic of Korea: 1st class (94%), special (99.95%) 
−United States: NIOSH-certified N95 (95%), N99 (99%), N100 (99.7%). 
 
 Some factors to consider when choosing particulate respirators in the health-care setting 
include affordability, availability, impact on mobility, impact on patient care, potential for 
exposure to higher levels of aerosolized respiratory secretions, and potential for reusable 
particulate respirators to serve as fomites for transmission.  
 Particulate respirators should be changed if they become wet or dirty. 
 
Medical (surgical or procedure) masks 
 
 Medical masks are flat/pleated masks (some are like cups) affixed to the head with straps. 
Medical masks are indicated when providing care for patients infected by droplet-
transmitted pathogens and/or as part of facial protection during patient-care activities that 
are likely to generate splashes or sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions or excretions.  
 Medical masks may not offer adequate respiratory protection against small-particle aerosols 
(droplet nuclei) and should not be used when caring for patients with diseases caused by 
pathogens transmitted by the airborne route unless particulate respirators are not available 
(184-186). 
 Medical masks are not designed to provide a face seal and thus do not prevent leakage 
around the edge of the mask when the user inhales, which is a potential major limitation for 
protection against droplet nuclei (187).  
 Medical masks should be changed if they become wet or dirty. 
 
Medical mask standards 
Medical masks protect the wearer's nose and mouth from inadvertent exposures (i.e. splashes) to 
blood and other body fluids. However, there are no minimum standards or standardized testing 
methods for mask filter efficiency, and there is a wide variety of filter efficiencies among available 
masks. As an example of standards, AORN recommends that surgical masks filter particles at least 
0.3 µ for regular use and 0.1 µ for laser use (i.e. to protect the wearer against laser smoke), or have 
90–95% bacterial filtration efficiency. Furthermore, surgical masks are classified as medical devices 
in the United States and are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA 
standards for surgical masks are as follows: 
 
 Fluid resistance 
− American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) F 1862-00a: standard test 
method for resistance of surgical mask to penetration by synthetic blood. 
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 Filtration efficiency 
− particulate filtration efficiency (PFE) – 0.1 µ polystyrene latex sphere 
− bacterial filtration efficiency (BFE) – ASTM F 2101-01: standard test method for 
evaluating the BFE of surgical masks using a biological aerosol of Staphylococcus 
aureus. 
 Air exchange (differential pressure, delta-P) 
− measure of breathability and comfort of surgical masks 
 Flammability 
− Class 1 and Class 2 flammability rating material for use in the operating room (OR). 
− Class 4 flammability rating is not appropriate for use in OR (would be labelled as 
“not for OR use”). 
 Biocompatibility 1 
 
 
                                                 
1 For more information, see: http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/ode/guidance/094.html 
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Annex B.  Principles and design of natural ventilation 
 
B.1 Principles of natural ventilation 
 
Two forces drive natural ventilation; wind pressure and stack pressure (188).  
 
Wind pressure 
When wind strikes a building, it induces positive pressure on the windward face, and negative 
pressure on the leeward face. This drives the air to flow in through windward openings in the building 
to the low pressure openings at the leeward face (Figure 5). It is possible to estimate the wind 
pressures for simple buildings (189). For simple buildings, existing data from wind tunnel tests may 
be used directly. For complex buildings, either wind tunnel tests (188) or computational fluid 
dynamics (190) may be needed. 
 









For single-sided ventilation, as shown in Figure 6, there is no contribution from mean wind pressures, 
but only from the fluctuating components. Correspondingly, the resulting ventilation flow rate may be 
significantly lower than that which can be achieved with cross ventilation. This single-sided 
ventilation design, which is the most commonly seen design in hospitals, cannot establish the pressure 
difference to drive constant air flow across the building, but can introduce pressure fluctuation and 
turbulent flow. The conditions can be improved by installing vent openings or exhaust fans to enhance 
ACH (189).  
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Stack pressure 
Stack pressure is generated by air temperature and humidity differences between indoor and outdoor 
air. These differences are associated with the different air densities between indoor and outdoor air 
that result in an imbalance in the pressure gradients of the interior and exterior air columns. This 
imbalance results in a vertical pressure difference.  
 
As shown in Figure 7A, when the room air is warmer than the outside air, the room air is lighter and 
rises. Air enters the building through lower openings, and escapes from upper openings. 
 
The flow direction reverses when the room air is cooler than the outside air (Figure 7B). In this 
situation, the room air is heavier than the outside air. Air enters the building through the upper 
openings, and escapes from the lower openings. In practice, wind and stack pressures can interact, 
either assisting or opposing each other (191). 
 
Figure 7. Stack driving air flow in a building: A) indoor air is warmer than outdoor air; 






















B.2 Design of natural ventilation  
As mentioned previously, the design of natural ventilation is important to achieve adequate ventilation, 
and also to reduce the risk of spread of respiratory infection. Careful analysis should be done of the 
prevailing winds (availability of winds). There are three hierarchies of design processes related to 
natural ventilation design (135-137):  
 
1. Site design  
Site design involves the building location, layout, orientation, and landscaping, which would 
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2. Building design  
Building design includes the type of building, building function, building form, envelope, 
natural ventilation strategy, internal distribution of space and functions, thermal mass, heating, 
ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) system (if present).  
 
There are a number of basic natural ventilation techniques. A list of options for natural ventilation 
may be useful to engineers, and allows them to adapt, as a design solution, a specific technique for a 
specific building based on the pros and cons of each option. For a particular design, various 
combinations may be possible for the site and building design. The basic methods most commonly 
adopted include the cross ventilation design and the passive stack method. 
 
Cross ventilation 
Cross ventilation allows outdoor air to flow across a room from one side to another by wind forces. 
This can generally be achieved by placing two openings opposite one another, one in the windward 
and another in the leeward face. Large windows for living spaces in the windward side would create a 
funnel effect to induce more incoming air. Interior partitions and furniture should not block the air 
flow. Large open spaces should always have large windows in opposite walls. 
As a rule of thumb, the ACH for wind-driven natural ventilation through a room with two opposite 




3600area openingsmaller   the(m/s) speed wind0.8  rate changeAir ×××=  
 
 
Passive stack ventilation  
Passive stack ventilation allows outdoor air to be driven through the stack by a combination of stack 
pressure and wind-induced suction pressure. Stack means a vertical pipe or duct. Air enters the 
building through lower vents provided for this purpose and is exhausted through the stack. For the 
system to work properly, each room is equipped with a separate stack, particularly in rooms where 
extraction is needed. Sometimes, a central stack links stack branches from each room, but this can 
create a risk of cross contamination between connected rooms. Stacks will not work alone. Air inlets 
also must be provided through intentional openings. The stack termination on the roof should be 
located in negative pressure regions to provide additional suction. If not designed properly, flow 
reversal can occur. If this flow reversal only occurs temporarily, it should not result in an indoor air 
quality problem, provided that the flow path is designed properly. 
 
Other methods 
Other methods include atria ventilation, solar chimneys, and wind towers, and can be integrated in the 
building design to enhance the effectiveness of natural ventilation (see Figure 8).    
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Figure 8.   Illustration of different natural and mixed mode ventilation systems (courtesy of 























3.  Vent opening design 
     Vent opening design involves the position of openings, types of openings, size of openings, and 
control strategy. These elements are briefly described below. 
 
 The total area of inlets should be as close as possible to the total area of outlets.  
 Vent openings should be positioned to avoid possible conflict between cross and stack 
ventilation, human cooling, or thermal mass cooling. 
 Types of openings (windows, screens, louvers, solar chimneys, passive stacks) should be 
determined by the ventilation requirements. The two main requirements are minimum 
ventilation requirements and transient high ventilation requirements. 
− Minimum ventilation requirements require permanently open vents. This requirement 
can be calculated based on the specifications in ventilation standards for acceptable 
indoor air quality (e.g. 12 ACH).  
− Transient high ventilation requirements require controllable large openings. There are 
no regulations to specify these requirements. Achieving a transient high ventilation 
rate is one of the most important benefits of natural ventilation. The transient high 
ventilation rate may also be needed when there are renovation activities in the 
building which generate very large amounts of pollutants in the air. Windows and 
doors that can be opened, and louvers, are the openings suitable for this purpose. 
 Size of openings should be designed to achieve the required ventilation flow rates based on 
certain geometry, climate, and building design data. Size of openings is also a function of the 
opening distribution, which is a part of the ventilation strategy. 
 The methods to estimate the ventilation flow rate can be direct and indirect. 
 
Mixed Mode Ventilation
Sketch of school system




Wind Tower Stack (Flue) Stack (Atrium)
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− Direct methods, also referred to as “explicit methods,” (192) are derived from the 
analytical solutions for ventilation in simple buildings. The ventilation flow rate can 
be a simple function of the governing parameters.  
− Indirect methods use network models to estimate the effect of different opening size 
combinations, and then identify the optimum size (193).  
− The effect of the temperature difference between the indoor and outdoor air also is 
worthy of discussion. Generally, the indoor air temperature should be maintained at 
comfort levels (194), e.g. between 20 °C and 28 °C. This means that the amount of 
the air temperature difference is a function of outdoor air temperature. During winter 
in a cold climate, the outdoor air temperature can be very low, and there will be a 
greater driving force for natural ventilation. This means that a small opening area 
may be used in cold climate. Care also should be taken to ensure that no cold 
draughts are introduced and some preheating of the outdoor air may be useful, such as 
placing a heater just below the ventilation inlet, e.g. below a window opening. During 
spring and autumn in moderate climates, the outdoor air temperature can be very 
close to the indoor air temperature, and the driving force (pressure differential) may 
be very small. 
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Annex C.  Routine and specific infection control 
precautions 
C.1 Standard Precautions  
 
Standard Precautions (64) are routine infection control precautions that should apply to ALL patients, 
in ALL health-care settings. 
 
Rationale 
Standard Precautions are the basic infection control precautions in health care. They are meant to 
minimize spread of infection associated with health care and to avoid direct contact with patient's 
blood, body fluids, secretions and non-intact skin. The SARS outbreak illustrated the critical 
importance of basic infection control precautions in HCFs.  Transmission of SARS in HCFs was often 
associated with noncompliance with Standard Precautions. The threat of emerging respiratory 
infectious diseases makes the promotion of Standard Precautions more important than ever, and it 
should be a priority in all HCFs.   
 
For additional information on Standard Precautions, see: 
Practical guidelines for infection control in health care facilities 2004,1  
Prevention of hospital-acquired infections: A practical guide, 2002,2   
Aide-memoire, Infection control standard precautions in health care, 20063. 
 
Detailed recommendations for each of the Standard Precautions components are described below. 
 
C.1.1 Hand hygiene 
Hand hygiene is one of the most important measures to prevent and control spread of disease in HCFs 
and is a major component of Standard Precautions. Although it is a simple procedure, numerous 
studies have shown that compliance with hand hygiene is low. Its implementation is complex, 
requiring continued reinforcement and multidisciplinary team coordination. The use of alcohol-based 
hand rubs in HCFs has been implemented in recent years in an attempt to increase compliance with 
hand hygiene.  The main points are: 
 Routine hand hygiene is performed by using an alcohol-based hand rub if hands are not 
visibly soiled, or by washing hands with soap and water and using a single-use towel for 
drying hands.  
 If hands are visibly dirty or soiled with blood, or other body fluids, or if broken skin might 
have been exposed to potentially infectious material, hands should be washed thoroughly with 
soap and water.  
 
Indications for hand hygiene: 
 Before and after any direct patient care. 
 Immediately after gloves are removed.  
 Before handling an invasive device not requiring a surgical procedure, including central 
intravascular catheters, urinary catheters, or peripheral vascular catheters. 
 After touching blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, non-intact skin, and contaminated 
items, even if gloves are worn.  
                                                 
1 Available at :  http://www.wpro.who.int/publications/PUB_9290222387.htm 
2 Available at http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/drugresist/WHO_CDS_CSR_EPH_2002_12/en/ 
3 Available at : http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/4EPR_AM2.pdf 
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 When moving from a contaminated to a clean body site during patient care, within the same 
patient.  
 After contact with inanimate objects in the immediate vicinity of the patient.  
 After using the lavatory.  
 
For additional information on hand hygiene, see:  
WHO guidelines on hand hygiene in health care (advanced draft), 20061  
 
C.1.2 Selection of PPE based on risk assessment 
 ROUTINELY ASSESS THE RISK of exposure to body substances or contaminated surfaces 
BEFORE any anticipated health-care activity. 
 Select PPE based on the assessment of risk.  
 Have appropriate PPE available in the event of an unexpected emergency. 
Gloves 
 Gloves should be worn whenever contact with blood, body fluids, secretions, excretions, 
mucous membranes, or non-intact skin is anticipated.  
 Change gloves between tasks and procedures on the same patient after contact with 
potentially infectious material.  
 Remove gloves after use, before touching non-contaminated items and surfaces, and before 
going to another patient.   
 Perform hand hygiene immediately after glove removal.  
Facial protection  
Wear facial protection, including a medical mask and eye protection (face shield, goggles), to protect 
the conjunctivae and the mucous membranes of the nose, eyes and mouth during activities that are 
likely to generate splashes or sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions, or excretions. When providing 
care, in close contact with a patient with respiratory symptoms (e.g. coughing/sneezing), sprays of 
secretions may occur and eye protection should be used. 
Gowns 
 Wear gowns to protect skin and prevent soiling of clothing during activities that are likely to 
generate splashes or sprays of blood, body fluids, secretions, or excretions. 
 Select a gown that is appropriate for the activity and amount of fluid likely to be encountered.  
If the gown in use is not fluid-resistant, a waterproof apron should be worn over the gown if 
splashing or spraying of potentially infectious material is anticipated.  
 Remove soiled gown as soon as possible, place it in a waste or laundry receptacle (as 
appropriate), and perform hand hygiene. 
 
C.1.3 Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette 
Controlling the spread of pathogens from infected patients (source control) is key to avoid 
transmission to unprotected contacts. For diseases transmitted through large droplets and/or droplet 
nuclei, respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette should be applied by all individuals with respiratory 
symptoms (60).  All individuals (HCWs, patients and visitors) with signs and symptoms of a 
respiratory infection should: 
                                                 
1   Available at: http://www.who.int/patientsafety/information_centre/ghhad_download/en/index.html 
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 cover their mouth and nose when coughing/sneezing; 
 use tissues, handkerchiefs, cloth masks or medical masks if available, as source control to 
contain respiratory secretions, and dispose of them into the waste containers; 
 use a medical mask on a coughing/sneezing person when tolerated and appropriate; and 
 perform hand hygiene. 
 
HCF management should promote respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette: 
 promote the use of respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette by all HCWs, patients and family 
members with acute febrile respiratory illness;  
 educate HCWs, patients, family members, and visitors on the importance of containing 
respiratory aerosols and secretions to help prevent the transmission of respiratory diseases; 
 consider providing resources for hand hygiene (e.g. dispensers of alcohol-based hand rubs, 
hand-washing supplies) and respiratory hygiene (e.g. tissues); areas of gathering, such as 
waiting rooms, should be prioritized. 
 
C.1.4 Environmental controls: cleaning and disinfection 
The viruses and bacteria that cause ARDs can survive in the environment for variable periods of time 
(hours to days), the environmental bioburden can be reduced by cleaning, and infectious agents can be 
inactivated by the use of standard hospital disinfectants. Environmental cleaning and disinfection is 
intended to remove pathogens or significantly reduce their numbers on contaminated surfaces and 
items, thus breaking the chain of transmission. Disinfection is a physical or chemical means of killing 
microorganisms (but not spores).  
 Cleaning MUST precede disinfection. Items and surfaces cannot be disinfected if they are not 
first cleaned of organic matter (patient excretions, secretions, dirt, soil, etc).  
 The cleaning process should be performed so as to avoid possible aerosolization. This process 
alone reduces significantly the environmental bioburden.  
 Follow the manufacturers’ recommendations for use/dilution, contact time, and handling of 
disinfectants.  
 The viruses and bacteria that cause ARDs are inactivated by a range of disinfectants (66, 195-
199). However, in some countries, regulatory agencies will control the types of disinfectant 
available for hospital use. Common hospital disinfectants include: 
− sodium hypochlorite (household bleach) (Annex H) 
− alcohol (Annex H) 
− phenolic compounds 
− quaternary ammonium compounds 
− peroxygen compounds. 
 Sodium hypochlorite and alcohol are available in most countries. The use of these two 
disinfectants is detailed in Annex H. 
C.1.4.1 Cleaning the patient-care environment 
 Horizontal surfaces in isolation rooms/areas, particularly those where the patient has been 
lying and/or has frequently touched, and immediately around the patient’s bed,  should be 
cleaned regularly and on discharge (200).  
 To avoid possible aerosolization of ARD pathogens, damp cleaning (moistened cloth) rather 
than dry dusting or sweeping should be performed.  
 During wet cleaning, cleaning solutions and equipment soon become contaminated; change 
cleaning solutions, cleaning cloths, and mop heads frequently according to HCF policies.  
 Equipment used for cleaning and disinfection must be cleaned and dried after each use. 
 Mop heads should be laundered daily and dried thoroughly before storage or reuse (201).  
 To facilitate daily cleaning, keep areas around the patient free of unnecessary supplies and 
equipment.  
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 Use disinfectant to wipe down the table and surrounding areas after attendance by patients 
known or suspected to be infected with an ARD of potential concern (35). If available, paper 
sheeting that is changed between patients may be useful for patient examination tables, after 
cleaning between patients.  
 Do not spray (i.e. fog) occupied or unoccupied rooms with disinfectant. This is a potentially 
dangerous practice that has no proven disease control benefit (202).  
 To facilitate cleaning, and to reduce the potential for aerosolization caused by use of a 
vacuum cleaner, accommodate patients in uncarpeted rooms/areas, if possible. If vacuuming 
is necessary, use a vacuum cleaner with a high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter, if 
available.  
C.1.4.2 Patient-care equipment 
 If equipment is reused, follow general protocols for disinfection and sterilization (203, 204).  
 If not visibly soiled, wipe external surfaces of large portable equipment (e.g. X-ray machines, 
ultrasound machines) that has been used in the isolation room/area with an approved hospital 
disinfectant upon removal from the patient’s room/area. 
 Proper cleaning and disinfection of reusable respiratory equipment is essential in ARD patient 
care (205-209). See Annex H for further details on use of disinfectants. 
C.1.4.3 Dishes and eating utensils 
 When possible, wash reusable items in a dishwasher (210, 211). If dishwashers are not 
available, the items should be washed by hand with detergents. Nonsterile rubber gloves 
should be used if washing items by hand. 
 Dishes and eating utensils for the patient should be washed after each meal/use. 
 Disposable items should be discarded as waste, classified as directed by the relevant 
state/territory or national legislation and regulations (4).  
C.1.4.4 Linen and laundry 
 Remove large amounts of solid material (e.g. faeces) from heavily soiled linen (wearing 
appropriate PPE) and place the solid wastes into a toilet for disposal before linen is placed 
into the laundry bag (212-214).  
 Avoid sorting linens in patient-care areas. Place contaminated linen directly into a laundry 
bag in the isolation room/area with minimal manipulation or agitation to avoid contamination 
of air, surfaces, and persons (4). 
 Wash and dry linen according to routine HCF standards and procedures.  For hot-water 
laundry cycles, wash with detergent/disinfectant in water at 70 °C (160 °F) for at least 25 
minutes. Choose a chemical suitable for low-temperature washing at proper use concentration 
if low-temperature < 70 ºC (< 160 ºF) laundry cycles are used (215-217).  
 
C.1.5 Waste management  
Waste disposal should be safe for those handling the waste and for the environment.  
  
Definitions of clinical (infectious) waste may differ according to local regulations and legislations.  
 Waste should be classified as directed by relevant state/territory or national legislation, and 
regulations. If waste from ARD infected patients is classified as infectious, then all waste 
from the patient-care area should be considered as clinical waste, and should be treated and 
disposed of according to HCF policy, and in accordance with national regulations pertaining 
to such waste (4). 
 Faeces should be handled with caution to avoid possible aerosolization (e.g. during removal 
of faeces from bedpan, commode, clothing, or spraying reusable incontinence pads with water) 
(212).  
 Liquid waste such as urine, or solid faecal waste, can be flushed into the sewerage system, if 
there is an adequate system in place (218, 219).  
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 HCWs should use appropriate PPE whenever there is risk of splash/spray during 
handling of waste (64).  
 
C.1.6 Packing and transporting patient-care equipment, linen and laundry, and 
wastes from isolation areas 
 Place used equipment and soiled linen and waste directly into containers or bags in the 
isolation room/area. 
 Contain the used equipment and soiled linen and waste in a manner that prevents the 
containers or bags from opening or bursting during transport. 
 One layer of packing is adequate providing the used equipment and soiled linen and waste can 
be placed in the bag without contaminating the outside of the bag. Double bagging is 
unnecessary. 
 All personnel handling the used equipment and soiled linen and waste should use Standard 
Precautions, and perform hand hygiene after removing PPE. 
 
C.1.7 Prevention of needle stick/sharp injuries 
Although it may not be crucial for prevention and control of ARDs, prevention of needle stick/sharp 
injuries is a component of Standard Precautions, and targets the reduction and elimination of 
transmission of bloodborne pathogens to HCWs, other patients, and persons with any possible contact 
with the related waste.  Detailed recommendations are addressed by the Safe Injection Global 
Network (SIGN) Alliance, at:1  
• Take care to prevent injuries when using needles, scalpels, and other sharp instruments or 
devices; when handling sharp instruments after procedures; when cleaning used instruments, 
or when disposing of used needles. 
 Never recap used needles. 
 Never direct the point of a needle towards any part of the body except prior to injection. 
 Do not remove used needles from disposable syringes by hand, and do not bend, break, or 
otherwise manipulate used needles by hand. 
 Dispose of syringes, needles, scalpel blades, and other sharp items in appropriate puncture-
resistant containers, which should be located as close as practical to the area in which the 
items were used. 
 Avoid the use of reusable syringes. 
 
C.2 Droplet Precautions (64) 
Respiratory pathogens that are transmitted through large droplets include adenovirus, human 
influenza, SARS and avian influenza A (H5N1).  Adenovirus infections are more common among 
children, and influenza and SARS can affect both adults and children. During an influenza pandemic, 
the circulating human virus is expected to be transmitted in the same manner as seasonal influenza 
viruses, and so Droplet Precautions should be applied in addition to Standard Precautions. 
Droplet Precautions include: 
 PPE: the use of a medical mask if working within 1 m of the patient (101, 220-222). For 
practical purposes, use of a medical mask when entering the patient's room is advised. 
 Patient placement: in single rooms or cohort patients with the same etiological diagnosis. If 
an etiological diagnosis is not possible, group patients with similar clinical diagnosis and 
based on epidemiological risk factors, with a spatial separation > 1m.  
                                                 
1 http://www.who.int/injection_safety/sign/en/ and are summarized below: 
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 Patient transport: limit patient movement; the patient should wear medical mask 
outside their room.  
 
C.3 Contact Precautions (64) 
In addition to transmission by large droplets, some common respiratory pathogens [e.g., parainfluenza 
and respiratory syncytial virus (RSV)] can be transmitted through contact; particularly hand 
contamination and self-inoculation into conjunctival or nasal mucosa. Contact transmission may also 
play a role in SARS and avian influenza A (H5N1) infections. 
Contact Precautions include: 
 PPE: (put on when entering the room and removed when leaving) 
− Gloves: clean, nonsterile, latex gloves should be used, and worn and be disposed after 
each patient contact 
− Gown: 
• A disposable gown made of synthetic fibre, or a washable cloth gown may be used. 
Ensure that gowns are of the appropriate size to fully cover the areas to be protected.  
• Gowns should preferably be worn once and then placed in a waste or laundry 
receptacle, as appropriate, and hand hygiene performed.  
• Aprons should only be used when the gown is permeable to reduce fluid penetration. 
They should not be used alone to prevent contact contamination. 
 Equipment and environment 
− If possible, use either disposable equipment or dedicate equipment, such as stethoscopes, 
blood pressure cuffs, thermometers, etc, to patients under Contact Precautions. If 
equipment needs to be shared among patients, it must be cleaned and disinfected between 
each patient use. 
− HCWs should refrain from touching their eyes, nose, or mouth with potentially 
contaminated gloved or ungloved hands (223).  
− Avoid contaminating environmental surfaces that are not directly related to patient care 
(e.g. door handles, light switches).  
 Patient placement: use of single rooms or cohorting patients with the same etiological 
diagnosis may facilitate the application of infection control measures.  
 Patient transport: limit patient movement ; contact with other non-infected persons should 
be minimized. 
 
C.4 Airborne Precautions  
Airborne pathogens are transmitted through inhalation of droplet nuclei that remain infectious over a 
long distance (e.g. > 1m), and require special air handling (2, 3). Their transmission is further 
classified as obligate or preferential (5). Obligate airborne transmission applies to agents naturally 
transmitted exclusively through droplet nuclei deposited in the distal part of the lung (e.g. 
Mycobacterium tuberculosis causing pulmonary tuberculosis) (5). Preferential airborne transmission 
applies to pathogens which are transmitted by droplet nuclei deposited in the airways but which can 
also be transmitted by other routes (e.g. measles) (5).  
Transmission of droplet nuclei at short range may also occur with human influenza, and perhaps other 
respiratory viral infections, during special circumstances, such as the performance of aerosol-
generating procedures associated with pathogen transmission (see Annex A.1) performed in 
inadequately ventilated rooms or lack of adequate use of PPE (e.g. SARS). This type of transmission 
has been referred to as "opportunistic airborne transmission" (5), and DOES NOT constitute the 
classical airborne transmission which involves transmission over a long distance (2). 
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C.4.1 Infection control precautions for airborne diseases 
For airborne pathogens (2, 3, 224, 225), the following should be added to Standard Precautions: 
 PPE: When entering the isolation room/area or when providing care to a patient with an 
obligate/preferential airborne infectious disease in other settings, use a particulate respirator 
that is at least as protective as a US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) certified N95 or equivalent (Annex A).  
 Patient placement: 
− Place the patient in a airborne precaution room (see Section V) (1). 
− If a ventilated isolation room is not available, place patients in separate well-ventilated 
rooms. 
− If single rooms are not available, cohort patients according to the same etiological 
diagnosis in well-ventilated places.  
− Aerosol-generating procedures associated with pathogen transmission should be 
performed using appropriate PPE in an airborne precaution room. 
 Patient transport: limit patient movement; the patient should wear a medical mask outside 
their room/area.  
 
C.4.2 Infection control precautions for diseases that can be opportunistically 
transmitted through droplet nuclei 
For most of these diseases, Droplet Precautions should be added to Standard Precautions, and special 
measures should be taken regarding room ventilation and PPE during aerosol-generating procedures 
associated with pathogen transmission. 
 PPE:  
− At a minimum, use a tightly-fitting medical mask (surgical or procedure mask) when 
entering the patient’s room; masking is mandatory if working at ≤ 1 m of the patient (226-
228).  
− When performing aerosol-generating procedures associated with pathogen transmission, 
use a particulate respirator that is at least as protective as a NIOSH-certified N95, EU 
FFP2 or equivalent, and gloves, gowns and eye protection (e.g. goggles) (55, 88, 168).  
 Patient placement: 
− Airborne precaution rooms are not obligatory. If they are available, they should be 
prioritized for patients with airborne transmitted diseases (21, 96);  
− Single rooms should be used if possible; if not available, may cohort according to the 
etiological diagnosis (21, 96). If etiological diagnosis is not possible, place patients so 
that they are > 1 m apart; 
− aerosol-generating procedures associated with pathogen transmission should be 
performed in well-ventilated single rooms (71, 72, 100, 169). 
 Patient transport: limit patient movement; patient should wear medical mask when 
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Annex D.  Sample checklist assessment of environmental 
conditions for home care of patients with ARDs of 
potential concern 
Infrastructure 
Functioning telephone  Y  N 
Any other means to rapidly communicate with the 
health system 
Y N 
Potable water   Y N 
Sewerage system Y N 
Cooking source (and fuel) Y N 
Operable electricity  Y  N  
Operable heat source  Y N  
Air conditioning Y N 
 
Accommodation 
Separate room/bedroom for the patient Y N 
Accessible bathroom in the home Y N 
 
Resources   
Food   Y N 
Necessary medications Y N 
Medical masks (patient)  Y N  
Medical masks (care providers, household contacts) Y N  
Gloves  Y N 
Hand hygiene items (soap, alcohol-based hand rub) Y N 
Household cleaning products Y N 
 
 
Primary care and support 
Person to provide care and support Y  N 
Access to medical advice/care Y N 
Any at-risk people at home 
(e.g. children < 2 years of age, elderly > 65 years 
of age, immunocompromised people) 
Y N 
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Annex E.  Sample HCW influenza-like illness monitoring form for 
HCW exposed to patients with ARDs of potential concern 
 
Name: ____________________________________  Home telephone number: _____________________ 
 
Job title:  _______________________________________  Work location:_________________________ 
 
Date/s of exposure (list all, use back of page if necessary):  ____/____/_______     ____/____/________   
 




Was the following personal protective equipment (PPE) used:   
PPE Yes No Don't know 
Gown F F F 
Gloves F F F 
Particulate respirator F F F 
Medical mask F F F 
Eye protection F F F 
Other 
(Please specify) 
F F F 
 
List any non-occupational exposures (i.e. exposure to birds or persons with severe acute febrile respiratory 
illness):  ____________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please check your temperature twice a day, in the morning (AM) and evening (PM), for 10 days after providing 
care for a patient infected with an ARD of potential concern (including 10 days after your last exposure), and 
also monitor yourself for any of the following influenza-like illness (ILI) symptoms including:   
- fever > 38 °C 
- cough 
- acute onset of respiratory illness 
- sore throat 
- arthralgia 
- myalgia or prostration 
- gastrointestinal symptoms (e.g. diarrhoea, vomiting, abdominal pain) 
If any symptoms of ILI occur, immediately limit your interactions with others, exclude yourself from public 
areas, and notify _______________________at _____________________ 
 
































No ____  Yes ___ 
ILI symptoms: 
No ___  Yes ___ 
ILI symptoms: 
No ___  Yes ____ 
ILI symptoms: 
No ___  Yes ____ 
ILI symptoms: 
No ___  Yes ____ 
 
 
































No ___  Yes ___ 
ILI symptoms: 
No ___  Yes ____ 
ILI symptoms: 
No ___  Yes ____ 
ILI symptoms: 
No ___  Yes ____ 
ILI symptoms: 
No ___  Yes ____ 
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 F.   Isolation rooms/areas 
F.1 Preparation of the isolation room/area 
 Ensure appropriate hand-washing facilities. 
 Ensure appropriate room ventilation (e.g. 12 ACH). 
 Post signage on the door. 
 Before being allowed into the isolation areas, visitors should consult the nurse in charge, who 
is also responsible for keeping a visitor record. A roster of all staff working in the isolation 
areas should also be kept for possible outbreak investigation and contact tracing. 
 Remove all non-essential furniture; the remaining furniture should be easy to clean, and 
should not conceal or retain dirt or moisture within or around it. 
 Stock PPE supply and linen outside the isolation room/area (e.g. in the change room). 
 Stock the sink area with suitable supplies for hand washing, and with alcohol-based hand rub 
near the point-of-care and room door. 
 Place appropriate waste bags in a bin. If possible, use a touch-free bin. Dirty bins should 
remain inside the isolation rooms. 
 Place a puncture-proof container for sharps disposal inside the isolation room/area. 
 Keep the patient’s personal belongings to a minimum. Keep water pitchers and cups, tissue 
wipes, and all items necessary for attending to personal hygiene within the patient’s reach. 
 Non-critical patient-care equipment (e.g. stethoscope, thermometer, blood pressure cuff, 
sphygmomanometer) should be dedicated to the patient, if possible. Any patient-care 
equipment that is required for use by other patients should be thoroughly cleaned and 
disinfected before use. 
 Set up a trolley outside the door to hold PPE. A checklist may be useful to ensure that all 
equipment is available (see sample checklist). 
 Place an appropriate container with a lid outside the door for equipment that requires 
disinfection or sterilization.  
 Keep adequate equipment required for cleaning or disinfection inside the isolation room/area 
and ensure scrupulous daily cleaning of the isolation room/area.    
 A telephone or other method of communication should be set up in the isolation room/area to 
enable patients or family members/visitors to communicate with HCWs in order to minimize 
the necessity for HCWs to enter the room/area. 
 
F.2 Wearing and removing PPE 
 
Before entering the isolation room/area:  
 Collect all equipment needed. 
 Perform hand hygiene with an alcohol-based hand rub (preferably) or soap and water.  
 Put on PPE in the order that ensures adequate placement of PPE items and prevents self-
contamination and self-inoculation while using PPE, and when taking PPE off. As an 
example and shown in Figure 9, PPE can be put on in the following order: hand hygiene; 
gown; mask or respirator; eye protection; gloves. 
 
Leaving the isolation room/area:  
 Remove PPE either in the anteroom, or if there is no anteroom, make sure that neither the 
environment outside the isolation room/area nor other persons can get contaminated. 
 Remove PPE in a manner that prevents self-contamination or self-inoculation with 
contaminated PPE or hands. General principles are: 
− Remove the most contaminated PPE items first. 
− Hand hygiene must be performed immediately after glove removal.  
− The last PPE item to be removed should be the mask or particulate respirator by grasping 
the ties and discarding in rubbish bin. 
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− Discard disposable items in a closed rubbish bin. 
− Put reusable items in a dry (e.g. without any disinfectant solution) closed container. As an 
example of  the order in which to take PPE off, it can be removed as follows (Figure 9): 
gloves (if gowns are disposable, gloves can be peeled off altogether with gown upon 
removal); hand hygiene; gown; eye protection; mask or respirator; hand hygiene. 
 
Perform hand hygiene with an alcohol-based hand rub (preferably) or soap 
and water whenever ungloved hands touch contaminated PPE items. 
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Figure  9.  Putting on and removing PPE 
 













































Put on a gown 
- Identify hazards & manage risk. Gather the necessary PPE. 
- Plan where to put on & take off PPE. 
- Do you have a buddy? Mirror? 
- Do you know how you will deal with waste? 
2 
3 Put on particulate respirator or medical mask; 
perform user seal check if using a respirator 
4 Put on eye protection e.g. face shield/goggles 
(consider anti-fog drops or fog-resistant goggles) 
Caps are optional: if worn, put on after eye protection 
5 Put on gloves 
(over cuff) 
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- Avoid contamination of self, others & the environment 






Remove gloves & gown:  
- peel off gown & gloves and roll inside, out 
- dispose gloves and gown safely 
 
Perform hand hygiene  
- Remove cap (if worn) 
- Remove goggles from behind 
- Put goggles in a separate container for reprocessing  
Remove respirator from behind 
Perform hand hygiene  
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F.3 Suggested checklist for isolation room/area trolley/table 
 
The following items should be kept on the trolley at all times so that PPE always is available for 
HCWs. 
 
For more information on isolation precautions, see: 
Practical guidelines for infection control in health care facilities 1 
Prevention of hospital-acquired infections: A practical guide 2  
For additional information on hand hygiene, see: 
WHO guidelines on hand hygiene in health care (advanced draft): a summary 3 
                                                 
1 Available at : http://www.wpro.who.int/publications/PUB_9290222387.htm 
2 Available at: http://www.who.int/csr/resources/publications/drugresist/WHO_CDS_CSR_EPH_2002_12/en/ 
3 Available at:  http://www.who.int/patientsafety/events/05/global_challenge/en/index.html 
Equipment Stock present 
Face shield/visor/goggles  
Gloves  
• reusable vinyl or rubber gloves for environmental cleaning 
• latex single-use gloves for clinical care  
 
Hair covers (optional)  
Particulate respirators (N95, FFP2, or equivalent)   
Medical (surgical or procedure) masks  
Gowns and aprons: 
• Single-use long-sleeved fluid-resistant or reusable non-fluid-
resistant gowns  
• Plastic aprons (for use over non-fluid-resistant gowns if 
splashing is anticipated and if fluid-resistant gowns are not 
available) 
 
Alcohol-based hand rub   
Plain soap (liquid if possible, for washing hands in clean water)  
Clean single-use towels (e.g. paper towels)  
Sharps containers  
Appropriate detergent for environmental cleaning and disinfectant 
for surface or instrument/equipment disinfection  
Large plastic bags  
Appropriate clinical waste bags  
Linen bags  
Collection container for used equipment  
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Annex G. Mortuary care and postmortem examination 
G.1 Packing and transport of dead body to mortuary, crematorium 
and burial 
 The body should be fully sealed in an impermeable body bag before removal from the 
isolation room/area and before transfer to pathology department or the mortuary to avoid 
leakage of body fluid.  
 Transfer to the mortuary should occur as soon as possible after death.  
 The body, when properly packed in the body bag, can be safely removed for storage in the 
mortuary, sent to the crematorium, or placed in a coffin for burial.  
 If an autopsy is being considered, the body may be held under refrigeration in the mortuary 
and be conducted only when a safe environment can be provided for the autopsy (see section 
V.5). 
 
G.2 Recommended PPE for HCWs handling the dead bodies 
 Disposable long-sleeved, cuffed gown, (waterproof, if the outside of body is visibly 
contaminated with body fluids, excretions or secretions). Alternatively, if no waterproof gown 
is available, a waterproof apron should be used in addition to the gown.  
 Nonsterile, latex gloves (single layer) should cover cuffs of gown.  
 If splashing of body fluids is anticipated, use facial protection: face shield (preferably) or 
goggles and a medical mask.  
 Perform hand hygiene after removal of PPE. 
 
G.3 Recommended PPE during autopsy 
G.3.1 PPE to be provided 
 scrub suits: tops and trousers, or equivalent garments  
 single-use, fluid-resistant, long-sleeved gowns  
 surgical masks, or if small particle aerosols might be generated during autopsy procedures, a 
particulate respirator at least as protective as a NIOSH-certified N95, EU FFP2 or equivalent  
 face shield (preferably) or goggles 
 either autopsy gloves (cut-proof synthetic mesh gloves) or two pairs of nonsterile gloves 
 knee-high boots. 
G.3.2 PPE placement  
 HCWs should put on PPE in the dress in room (see Figure 10) before proceeding to the 
autopsy room where the body is located. 
 In the dress in room, HCWs should replace their outer street clothes and shoes with scrub 
suits, or equivalent coverall garments, plus boots. 
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G.3.3 PPE removal 
 Exit the autopsy room to the dress out room as suggested in Figure 10. 
 Remove PPE in designated dress out room, dispose of the PPE in accordance with 
recommendations and perform hand hygiene.  
 
G.4 Suggested methods to reduce aerosol-generation during 
autopsy 
 Containment devices should be used whenever possible (e.g. biosafety cabinets for the 
handling and examination of smaller specimens). 
 Vacuum shrouds should be used for oscillating saws.  
 High pressure water sprays should not be used. 
 Open intestines under water. 
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Annex H.  Use of disinfectants: alcohol and bleach 
 
In different countries, there are different disinfection protocols. HCFs with limited resources may not 
have access to the different types of hospital disinfectants. Alcohol and bleach are acceptable 
chemical disinfectants if used appropriately. As with any other disinfectants, soiled surfaces need to 
be cleaned with water and detergent before applying alcohol or bleach. 
 
Alcohol 
Alcohol is effective against influenza virus (229).  Ethyl alcohol (70%) is a powerful broad-spectrum 
germicide and is considered generally superior to isopropyl alcohol. Alcohol is often used to disinfect 
small surfaces (e.g. rubber stoppers of multiple-dose medication vials, and thermometers) and 
occasionally external surfaces of equipment (e.g. stethoscopes and ventilators). Because alcohol is 
flammable, its use as a surface disinfectant should be limited to small surface areas and it should be 
used in well-ventilated spaces only. Alcohol may also cause discoloration, swelling, hardening, and 
cracking of rubber and certain plastics after prolonged and repeated use. 
 
 
Sodium hypochlorite (bleach) 
Bleach is a strong and effective disinfectant, but it is readily inactivated in the presence of organic 
material. Its active ingredient, sodium hypochlorite, is effective in killing bacteria, fungi and viruses, 
including influenza virus. Diluted household bleach  disinfects within 10–60 minutes contact time 
(see Table 7 for concentrations and contact times), is widely available at a low cost, and may be 
recommended for surface disinfection in HCFs.  However, bleach irritates mucous membranes, the 
skin and the airways, decomposes under heat and light, and reacts readily with other chemicals. 
Therefore, caution is advised when bleach is used. Ventilation should be adequate and consistent with 
relevant occupational health and safety guidance. Improper use of bleach, including deviation from 
recommended dilutions (either stronger or weaker), may reduce its effectiveness for disinfection and 
can result in HCW injury. 
 
Procedures for preparing/using diluted bleach  
 Use a mask, rubber gloves, and waterproof apron. Goggles also are recommended to protect 
the eyes from splashes. 
 Mix and use bleach solutions in well-ventilated areas.   
 Mix bleach with cold water because hot water decomposes the sodium hypochlorite and 
renders it ineffective. 
 Bleach containing 5% sodium hypochlorite should be diluted as shown in Table 7 below.  
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Table 7. Sodium hypochlorite: concentration and use 
 
Starting solution 
Most household bleach solutions contain 5% sodium hypochlorite (50 000 ppma available chorine)
 
Recommended dilution 
1:100 dilution of 5% sodium hypochlorite is the usual recommendation. Use 1 part bleach to 99 
parts cold tap water (1:100 dilution) for disinfection of surfaces 
 
Adjust ratio of bleach to water as needed to achieve appropriate concentration of sodium 
hypochlorite, e.g. for bleach preparations containing 2.5% sodium hypochlorite, use twice as much 
bleach (i.e. 2 parts bleach to 98 parts water) 
 
Available chlorine after dilution 
For bleach preparations containing 5% sodium hypochlorite, a 1:100 dilution will yield 0.05% or 
500 ppm available chlorine 
 
Bleach solutions containing other concentrations of sodium hypochlorite will contain different 
amounts of available chlorine when diluted 
 
Contact times for different uses 
Disinfection by wiping of nonporous surfaces: a contact time of ≥ 10 min is recommended 
Disinfection by immersion of items: a contact time of 30 min is recommended 
 
N.B. Surfaces must be cleaned of organic materials, such as secretions, mucus, vomit, faeces, 
blood, or other body fluids before disinfection or immersion.  
 
appm: parts per million 
 
 
Precautions for the use of bleach 
 Bleach can corrode metals and damage painted surfaces. 
 Avoid touching the eyes. If bleach gets into the eyes, immediately rinse with water for at least 
15 minutes, and consult a physician. 
 Bleach should not be used together with, or mixed with, other household detergents because 
this reduces its effectiveness and can cause chemical reactions.  
 A toxic gas is produced when bleach is mixed with acidic detergents, such as those used for 
toilet cleaning, and this gas can cause death or injury. If necessary, use detergents first, and 
rinse thoroughly with water before using bleach for disinfection. 
 Undiluted bleach liberates a toxic gas when exposed to sunlight and should be stored in a cool, 
shaded place, out of the reach of children. 
 Sodium hypochlorite decomposes with time. To ensure its effectiveness, purchase recently-
produced bleach, and avoid over-stocking. 
 Diluted bleach should be made fresh daily, labelled, dated, and unused portions discarded 24 
hours after preparation.   
 Organic materials inactivate bleach; surfaces must be cleaned of organic materials before 
disinfection with bleach.  
 Keep diluted bleach covered, protected from sunlight, in a dark container (if possible), and 
out of the reach of children. 
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Annex I.  Surge capacity: HCF PPE needs during 
epidemics/pandemics 
 
Providing guidance for hospitals wishing to stockpile PPE for epidemic/pandemic ARDs is extremely 
difficult. This Annex is meant to provide a step-by-step approach for estimating additional HCF PPE 
needs. Some key steps include: 
 definition of assumptions;  
 producing estimates; and 
 definition of a purchasing strategy to meet the planned needs, replenishment and monitoring 
of stock expiration and utilization.  
 
In this section we provide an example of assumptions and respective estimates. Each HCF 
should follow the national assumptions, and adapt to its local policies and rationale. 
 
Planning assumptions 
The assumptions to be taken into consideration include the rationale on the use of PPE, the expected 
impact of an epidemic (e.g. proportion of the population diseased, seeking care, being hospitalized), 
organization of health services (e.g. frequency of HCW–patient encounters), recommended infection 
control precautions and duration of the epidemic.  
 
Medical masks 
Medical masks should be changed between uses and whenever they become wet, damaged, or visibly 
soiled. In conditions of increased air temperature and humidity, it can be assumed that masks will 
become wet with perspiration more quickly (surgical mask standards are described in Annex A). 
Wearing additional PPE, such as gowns and gloves will also increase perspiration.   
 
Respirators 
There are no published data on the length of time respirators are effective for the wearer. Respirators 
are disposable, but can be reused repeatedly by the same HCW when working with tuberculosis 
patients because tuberculosis has not been documented to spread by contact, and contamination of the 
respirator is not a concern in tuberculosis transmission. Humidity, dirt, and crushing reduce the 
efficiency of the respirator, and respirators should be stored in a clean, dry location. When used in the 
care of tuberculosis patients, respirators can be reused until they are wet, soiled, damaged, or difficult 
to breathe through (the filter will eventually become "clogged" with trapped particles making it 
difficult to breathe through).  Filtration efficiency actually increases as more particles are trapped in 
the filter. However, because many ARD pathogens, including SARS, avian or pandemic influenza, 
also can be spread by contact in addition to respiratory aerosols, contaminated respirators could play a 
role in disease transmission. The concern about the reuse of respirators and other equipment relates to 
surface contamination and the possible risks of self-contamination and self-inoculation that may result 
when HCWs handle potentially contaminated equipment.  Educating HCWs on how to safely remove, 
store, handle and re-apply potentially contaminated equipment is critical.   
 
At this time, there are no recommendations on the reuse of respirators in the care of patients with 
ARDs that can be spread by different sizes of respiratory aerosol particles and by contact. Currently, it 
is recommended that medical masks and respirators be discarded after each use when used in the care 
of such patients. 
 
Entry of HCWs into the isolation room/area 
Another issue that must be considered when making planning assumptions is the anticipated number 
of HCW entries into the isolation room/area, whether any PPE will be reused by the same HCW 
during a shift, and how many different HCWs will enter the isolation room/area. All of these factors 
have a direct relationship to how much PPE will be used. The number of different HCWs entering the 
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isolation room/area and the number of entries of each HCW should be limited to the minimum 
necessary for patient care. To minimize the number of different HCWs who enter the isolation 
room/area, tasks should be carried out by the minimum number of HCWs possible. Another way to 
reduce the number of HCW isolation room/area entries is to have a means of communication between 
the patient/family in the room and HCWs outside the room via phone or other device. Cohorting of 
patients may result in less need for some PPE, since several patients could be attended without the 
HCW leaving the isolation room/area. It should also be anticipated that HCWs providing care to 
patients with ARDs of potential concern will need "PPE breaks” because wearing PPE is hot and 
fatiguing, and these factors may contribute to inadvertent infection control breaches. 
 
Assumptions about factors such as these must be built into any mathematical model used for 
estimating the amounts of PPE needed. For example:  
 Number of epidemic/pandemic ARD patients per day for an average of X number of days. 
 Number of HCW entries into the isolation room/area per shift; length of shifts. 
 Number of different HCWs with direct contact with epidemic/pandemic patients per day.   
 Infection control precautions recommended. 
 Duration of the epidemic/pandemic wave. 
 Estimated numbers of cohorted patients (e.g. X patients per cohort unit vs. X patients in 
single rooms). 
 Number of times items can be reused (e.g., cloth gowns, goggles, face shields). Fewer masks 
may be needed on patient cohort units because the same respiratory protection equipment 
could be worn during the care of multiple patients.   
 Whether medical masks would be provided for patients/visitors. 
 
A sample calculation for additional PPE required for an epidemic/pandemic ARD response is 
provided below. For this purpose, an example of scenario during a pandemic influenza wave is used. 
Routine PPE needs for Standard and other Specific Precautions not related to ARD patient care are 
not included in these estimates. HCFs should use the regular estimates that are applied in non-
epidemic/pandemic situations.   
 
Sample calculation for HCF PPE needs in human influenza pandemic  
Several countries have developed planning assumptions ("National Influenza Pandemic Plans" 
available at http://www.who.int/csr/disease/influenza/nationalpandemic/en/index.html). The example 
below is based on some of these plans, but above all, this example is meant to provide the step-by-
step of calculations, and the national planning assumptions should be used for local application.  
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Scenario for sample calculation* 
Infection control recommendations for routine care of 
pandemic influenza patients 
Standard + Droplet Precautions 
Main points: 
 reinforce respiratory hygiene/cough 
etiquette 
 HCWs use medical masks when in close 
contact with patients 
 reinforce hand hygiene 
Infection control recommendations when performing 
aerosol-generating procedures (see Annex A) 
PPE should include long-sleeved gown, single-use 
gloves, eye protection (e.g. goggle, face shield) 
and respiratory protection. 
Population 100 000 persons 
Duration of pandemic wave 90 days 
Duration of infectious period/hospital days per patient 7 days 
% population developing clinical symptoms 30% (30 000 persons) 
% persons with symptoms seeking care 100% (30 000 persons)  
% persons with symptoms seeking hospital care 2% (600, of whom 480 in wards and 120 in 
intensive care units 
% patients with symptoms receiving home care 98% (29 400 persons) 
*Note: the PPE estimates will change if any of the individual assumptions are changed. 
 
Sample calculation of PPE needs in HCF according to the scenario above 
Item Assumptions Needs 
Medical masks for hospital inpatients 
No. of inpatients in wards = 480 Patient to use mask when out of 
isolation room; allow 1 
mask/patient/day for 7 days 
3 360 
No. of patients in intensive care = 120 Most patients will not be able to use 
masks; all will survive and will use 
masks for 4 days (overestimate) 
480 
Masks for visitors 
600 inpatients each receive 2 visitors/day; no. 
of visits/day = 1200; no. of days = 7  
1 medical mask/visitor/visit;  
2 visits/patient/day for 7 days 
8 400 
Masks for HCWs 
Medical masks for HCWs caring for 600 
patients for 7 days 
12 HCW entries/isolation room/day 
+ 2 aerosol-generating 
procedures/patient/day 
50 400 
TOTAL medical masks  62 640 
   







Disposable face shields or goggles 
or 





2/patient/day reprocessed* 10 times 
or 







Disposable (no reuse and discarded) gowns 
or 
Cloth gowns (no reuse on same day; laundered 















*Items may be reprocessed more or fewer times depending on type of reprocessing used and the ability of the 
equipment to withstand reprocessing. 
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Annex J.  Cleaning and disinfection of respiratory 
equipment 
 
Respiratory therapy equipment is considered semi-critical (i.e. items that come into contact with 
mucous membranes), and it is recommended that semi-critical items receive a minimum of high-level 
disinfection between patients (204). After cleaning, high-level disinfection of respiratory equipment is 
typically accomplished by chemical germicides or physical methods (230).   
 
Chemical germicides used for high-level disinfection include glutaraldehyde-based formulations (2%), 
stabilized hydrogen peroxide (6%), peracetic acid (variable concentrations, but < 1% is sporicidal), 
and sodium hypochlorite 5.25%, 1000 ppm available chlorine (1:50 dilution) (204). The most 
appropriate chemical germicide for a particular situation should be selected on the basis of the object 
to be disinfected, its composition, intended use, the level of disinfection needed, and the scope of 
services, physical facilities, the HCF resources and personnel available.  
 
Physical methods to accomplish high-level disinfection include hot water disinfection (pasteurization) 
or steam (e.g. autoclaving at lower temperature). Pasteurization is a non-toxic, cost-effective 
alternative to high-level disinfection with chemical germicides.  Equipment should be submerged for 
> 30 minutes in water > 70 ºC (less than the temperature that typically damages plastic). 
Pasteurization can be accomplished using a commercial washer/pasteurizer (231), and after 
pasteurization, wet equipment is typically dried in hot-air drying cabinets before storage. Steam 
sterilization is an inexpensive and effective method for sterilization or high-level disinfection. Steam 
sterilization is unsuitable, however, for processing plastics with low melting points, powders, or 
anhydrous oils. Bacterial spores may survive after high-level disinfection. Microbiological sampling 
can verify that a high-level disinfection process has resulted in the destruction of vegetative bacteria; 
however, this sampling is not routinely recommended. 
 
Steps for cleaning and disinfection of plastic pieces of respiratory equipment: 
PPE is required when cleaning or processing equipment and instruments to protect against splashing, 
spraying or aerosols. 
1. Wash the equipment with soap (e.g. liquid dish soap) and clean water. 
2. Rinse completely with clean water. 
3. Disinfect equipment to inactivate any remaining pathogens.  
There are several ways to disinfect equipment, and the available products at the HCF should be used. 
Safe methods of disinfection include: 
 Heat for "heat resistant" equipment which can withstand high temperature, e.g. 80 °C. Such 
equipment can be disinfected by washer-disinfector. 
 If washer/pasteurizer is not available, a high-end or commercial dishwasher with a “sanitize” 
feature that can reach 70 °C may be used.  
 For plastic equipment which may not tolerate 80 °C and for equipment that may be damaged 
by boiling, or if the above named facilities are not available, chemical disinfection may be 
used [(e.g. soak in 1:100 sodium hypochlorite solution for 30 minutes (see Annex H)]. 
 
 
4. Rinse (ONLY IF CHEMICAL DISINFECTION) with sterile or clean water (water boiled for 5 
minutes and cooled). Sterile water is preferred to tap or unsterilized distilled water for rinsing off 
residual liquid chemical disinfectant from a respiratory device that has been chemically disinfected for 
reuse, because tap or distilled water may harbour microorganisms that can cause pneumonia. However, 
when rinsing with sterile water is not feasible, rinsing with tap water or filtered water (water passed 
through a 0.2 µ filter), followed by an alcohol rinse and forced-air drying may be done.  
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5. Dry  
 Physical methods frequently have this feature within the machine (e.g. washer/pasteurizer, 
autoclave). 
 For chemical methods let equipment parts air dry on a clean towel or cloth. 
6. Store dry in closed packages. 
 
Summary: wash with soap and clean water, rinse, disinfect, rinse (if chemical method), dry, and 
store. 
 
Cleaning and disinfection of mechanical ventilators: 
 The controls and entire outside of mechanical ventilators should be wiped down with a 
compatible HCF disinfectant (e.g. sodium hypochlorite solution for non-metal surfaces). 
 Disinfection of tubing can be accomplished using sodium hypochlorite solution, ensuring that 
the entire lumen of the tubing is flushed (see "Steps for cleaning and disinfection of plastic 
pieces of respiratory equipment" above). 
 Inspiratory and pressure lines within a ventilator are not routinely cleaned between patients 
because they are not exposed to the patient or their respiratory secretions. 
 
Usually the entire expiratory side tubing is removable (the expiratory end has a valve to control the 
escape of gas from the circuit and also may have a flow measurement device and/or a water trap). 
This tubing should be disassembled and cleaned first with a detergent, rinsed clean, and then 
subjected to either high-level disinfection or sterilization. High-level disinfection is the minimum 
required procedure for these items, but due to the practicability of some sterilization methods and 
HCF protocols (e.g. steam), these items can be, if suitably-designed, submitted to sterilization.   
 
When mechanical ventilators are used in the care of a patient with an ARD of potential concern, 
bacterial/viral filters are recommended on exhalation valves. See section A.3 of Annex A for details. 
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Annex K.  Infection control across the continuum of health 
care 
 
The principles of infection control are the same across the continuum of health care. Areas that 
require particular attention are listed below. 
K.1 Emergency and outpatient care 
 
In countries without reported ARDs of potential concern: 
 Post signage to alert persons with severe acute febrile respiratory illness to notify staff 
immediately and to use respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette:1 
 Evaluate patients with acute febrile respiratory illness as promptly as possible.  
 Consider scheduling outpatient clinic patients with acute febrile respiratory disease in 
different locations from other patients, either totally separate, or ≥ 1 m (3 feet) between each 
patient in the waiting area. 
 Provide tissues in the waiting area to contain respiratory secretions when coughing or 
sneezing whenever possible. Provide receptacles for disposal of used tissues (no-touch 
receptacles if possible).  
 Mask persons with acute febrile respiratory illness upon entry, if possible. 
 Encourage hand hygiene after contact with respiratory secretions and provide hand hygiene 
facilities (e.g. sinks equipped with water, soap and single use towel, alcohol-based hand rub) 
in waiting areas whenever possible.  
 Eliminate or decrease the use of items shared by patients such as pens, clipboards, telephones, 
etc.  
 Clean and disinfect environmental surfaces in waiting and patient-care areas at least daily and 
when visibly soiled.  
 Ensure that patient-care equipment is appropriately cleaned and disinfected between patients.  
 HCWs should use Standard and Droplet Precautions when providing care, in close contact, 
for patients with acute febrile respiratory illness.  
 If a patient known or suspected to be infected with an ARD of potential concern is referred to 
another HCF, notify the receiving HCF staff of the necessary infection control precautions.  
  
In countries with reported ARDs of potential concern, in addition to the above measures, also:  
 Educate the public about the clues (i.e. signs or symptoms) of ARDs of potential concern and 
ask them to seek medical care promptly for assessment and admission.  
 Establish triage criteria to promptly identify persons at risk of infection with an ARD of 
potential concern.  
 If an ARD of potential concern is suspected, HCWs should use appropriate PPE (see Table 1), 
as available.  
 High-risk aerosol-generating procedures in patients with severe acute febrile respiratory 
illness (Annex A) should not be performed in the ambulatory-care setting, unless they are 
necessary to save life and no alternative exists. 
 If such a procedure is performed in this setting, a well-ventilated separate room should be 
used, and participating HCWs should use appropriate PPE.  
 After a patient known or suspected to be infected with an ARD of potential concern has left 
the ambulatory-care setting, clean and disinfect environmental surfaces in the examination 
room or other areas where the patient was located and clean and disinfect any patient-care 
equipment used for the patient.  
 
                                                 
1 http://www.cdc.gov/flu/protect/covercough.htm 
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K.2 Paediatric acute care  
Several aspects are particular to paediatric patients and should be taken into consideration when 
implementing infection control measures. 
 Family members are essential for the emotional support of hospitalized paediatric patients (36, 
232). The child's right to be accompanied by a parent/relative/legal guardian at all times 
should be guaranteed (233).  
 Family members may be critical in assisting in the care of hospitalized paediatric patients, 
particularly if there is a shortage of HCWs (85).  
 Paediatric patients are likely to be infectious with ARDs longer than adults; this will impact 
the duration of infection control precautions (74).  
 Paediatric patients may not be able to comply with respiratory hygiene. 
 Some pathogens are more prevalent among paediatric patients and require additional 
precautions (e.g. Contact Precautions required for RSV or parainfluenza virus; and Contact 
plus Droplet Precautions for adenovirus or metapneumovirus) (222).  
 Contamination of the environment may be more prominent compared to that with adult or 
continent patients.  
 Toys should be cleaned and disinfected between different children, and precautions should be 
taken when gathering patients in the playroom (follow the same principles as for cohorting) 
(234-237). 
  
K.3 "Home care" for ARD patients 
 During a public health emergency, such as a pandemic, it may not be possible to provide 
acute or ambulatory-care services for all persons who might need them. It is possible that 
acute care HCFs will triage patients and may only be able to provide care for the most 
severely ill patients who are considered to have a chance of survival (238). It also is possible 
that ambulatory-care facilities may be unable to meet the demand for health-care services. 
 Patients infected with ARDs of potential concern may require care in the home setting. Such 
patients may be quite ill. In addition, such patients will be infectious to others for a period of 
time and could transmit pathogens and secondary infection or disease to their household 
contacts (239, 240).  
 
Infection control recommendations for the home setting 
ARDs can spread easily within a household. Everyone in contact with an ill person who has not 
already been infected is at risk for infection. Household members should observe the following 
recommendations:  
 Limit contact with the ill person as much as possible. Stay in a different room or if that is not 
possible, stay as far away from the ill person as possible, e.g. sleep in a separate bed and 
bedroom, if possible.  
 Shared spaces (restrooms, kitchen, bathroom, etc) should be well ventilated (e.g. natural 
ventilation, keeping windows open). 
 Cleaning of the environment is important to prevent indirect transmission, particularly in 
shared spaces. 
 If close contact care must be provided to the ill person, the ill person should cover their 
mouth/nose with hands or other materials (e.g. tissues, handkerchiefs, or, if available, a cloth 
or medical mask). If available, the caregiver also should wear a medical mask or the best 
available protection against respiratory droplets when in close contact with the ill person. 
 Materials used to cover the mouth/nose should be discarded or cleaned appropriately.  
 Avoid direct contact with body fluids. If contact occurs, perform hand hygiene immediately 
afterwards.  
 Hand hygiene can be performed by means of hand washing with soap and water or an 
alcohol-based hand rub. There are safety concerns (i.e. accidental ingestion, fire hazards) that 
must be addressed before alcohol-based hand rubs can be recommended for household use.  
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 Persons at increased risk of severe disease should not care for the ill person or be in close 
contact with the ill person. For seasonal influenza, persons at increased risk include those 
with heart, lung or kidney disease, diabetes, immunosuppression, blood disease (e.g. sickle 
cell anaemia), pregnant women, people > 65 years of age or children < 2 years of age. 
 Other types of possible exposure to the ill person or contaminated items should be avoided, 
e.g. sharing toothbrushes, cigarettes, eating utensils, drinks, towels, washcloths, or bed linens. 
 Public health recommendations in place at the time should be followed if a household 
member develops symptoms. Symptoms of ARD include fever, cough, sore throat, and 
difficulty breathing. 
 People caring for a family member suffering from an ARD of potential concern should limit 
their contact with others and should follow national/local policies regarding home quarantine 
recommendations. 
 
If the ill person needs medical care, he/she should: 
 Notify health-care provider of diagnosis and receive instructions on where to seek care, 
when/where to enter the HCF, and the infection control precautions that are to be followed. 
 Avoid public transportation, if possible. Call an ambulance or transport with own vehicle and 
open vehicle windows. 
 Always perform respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette. 
 Try to stand or sit as far away from others as possible (≥ 1 m), when in transit and when in the 
HCF.  
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